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 This dissertation proposes and shows that real options reasoning is important for 
understanding firms’ value appropriation strategies in innovation. Despite a large body of 
research on real options for value creation in innovation, how real options reasoning can inform 
firms’ decision-making in value appropriation strategies under uncertainty has received 
relatively little scrutiny. My dissertation seeks to address this gap in the literature by examining 
what drives firms to purchase real options as mechanisms to preserve flexibility in their 
commitment decisions in patenting strategies. 
In my first empirical study (Chapter 2), I seek to examine the patent-secrecy choice as an 
exemplar of the value of such real options in appropriability strategies. As a primary hypothesis, 
I propose that the greater the risk of technology disclosure to rivals due to patenting, the more 
likely that firms purchase “secrecy options” to retain secrecy of inventions while attempting to 
patent them. I employ a difference-in-differences research design that leverages the American 
Inventors Protection Act, a quasi-exogenous change in U.S. patent law that resulted in faster 
disclosure of technologies pursuing patent protection, and show that firms were more likely to 
purchase secrecy options (by filing provisional patent applications) for patents affected by faster 
disclosure. Further, I find that this effect was quite large, and more pronounced for smaller firms 
and more novel technologies.  
In my second empirical study (Chapter 3), I examine how firms strategically respond to 
the patent racing incentives created by a first-past-the-post principle of the patent system, and 
propose that they may do so by capitalizing on real options – represented by provisional 
applications – in the patenting process. I employ a difference-in-differences design that leverages 
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the transition of the U.S. patent system from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file system following 
the America Invents Act, and show that firms were more likely to file provisional applications 
(as real options on future patent applications) under a first-to-file system. Furthermore, I show 
that the magnitude of this effect depended on contingencies such as the firm’s technological 
dominance, industry concentration and patent effectiveness.  
In my third empirical study (Chapter 4), I examine firms’ revealed preference to purchase 
real options in patent term extension by leveraging the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, which changed U.S. patent term from a 17-years-from-issuance to a 
20-years-from-priority date term. I show that patent prosecution uncertainty increases the value 
of real options in patent term extension, consistent with real options theory. I find that a firm’s 
purchase of real options is further related to industry differences, invention value, and the type of 
patent application (original versus continuing).    
My dissertation contributes to the literature in real options theory as well as 
appropriability strategies by applying received theory to a new context. Implications for 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Appropriability – how do firms profit from innovation – is a fundamental research 
question in the technology strategy literature (e.g., Teece, 1986). A large body of research has 
examined different types of “appropriability mechanisms” whereby firms capture value from 
inventions, such as patents, secrecy, complementary assets, and lead time advantages (e.g., 
Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000; James, Leiblein, & Lu, 2013; Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, & 
Winter, 1987). Among these appropriability mechanisms, my dissertation focuses on strategies 
firms use to obtain the patent right on their inventions to protect them against rivals.   
Patenting is costly (Sichelman & Graham, 2010). The pecuniary costs of patenting 
include the significant legal costs of conducting patent searches and drafting patent applications 
in addition to the straight-up fees which need to be paid to the patent office for filing, issuance, 
and maintenance. Furthermore, patenting entails significant opportunity costs. Drafting patent 
applications may divert inventors’ time and attention from value-creating innovation activities. 
Making errors in drafting the right patent application (which are often only evident ex post) – e.g., 
delineating the right patent scope and claims – can be consequential. Patenting also requires 
giving up secrecy of inventions, which is an alternative appropriability mechanism that can 
potentially be more valuable in the long run. Both the pecuniary and opportunity costs of 
patenting represent significant irreversible commitments it requires.   
At the same time, firms make patenting decisions under significant ex ante uncertainties – 
technological, commercial, and/or legal (e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, 2005; Pakes, 1986; Somaya, 
2012) – which blurs the value of the patent right to be obtained. These uncertainties are in part 
evidenced by an empirical finding that 60% of U.S. patents were abandoned (i.e., not renewed) 
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by patentees before expiry (Serrano, 2010). Another finding shows that the value distribution of 
patents is highly skewed (Harhoff, Scherer, & Vopel, 2003); only 10% of U.S. and German 
patents created 85% of the total value (Scherer & Harhoff, 2000). 
In order to deal with the ex ante uncertainties in the value of the patent right as well as 
the costly commitments patenting requires, firms need to strategize their patenting decisions. 
This situation at issue is analogous to one in which firms contemplate irreversible investment 
decisions before substantial uncertainties are resolved. In this situation, real options theory 
provides important insights on how firms can preserve future decision rights, avoiding costly 
commitments to potentially risky choices (e.g., Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). The real options 
literature suggests that instead of making a full-blown commitment decision now, firms may 
purchase a real option, a right but not an obligation, to invest in the risky choice at a later time 
(i.e., to exercise the option). Thus, in my dissertation I posit that such real options reasoning can 
be valuable for understanding firms’ patenting strategies.     
Indeed, various topics in strategic management have been greatly informed by real 
options reasoning (Li et al., 2007; Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017), such as market entry timing (e.g., 
Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; McDonald & Siegel, 1986), modes of entry (e.g., Kulatilaka & Perotti, 
1998), and organizational forms (e.g., Folta & Miller, 2002; Kogut, 1991), and preemption 
versus cooperation tradeoffs (e.g., Smit & Trigeorgis, 2004; Teece, 1992). In the technology and 
innovation strategies space, prior research has shed light on how firms use real options reasoning 
to create value through innovation. Much of the empirical work has examined R&D strategies 
whereby current innovations open up opportunities for follow-on innovations in a technological 
space, taking a growth option and/or a “portfolio of options” perspective (e.g., Hurry, Miller, & 
Bowman, 1992; Mitchel & Hamilton, 1987; McGrath, 1997; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004). 
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However, despite the large body of research on real options for value creation in 
innovation, how real options reasoning can inform firms’ decision-making in value 
appropriation strategies remains understudied. This gap in the literature is surprising because 
value appropriation strategies to capture profits from innovation are widely understood to be 
critical for firms (e.g., Lepak et al., 2007; Nordhaus, 1969; Teece, 1986; Scherer, 1965), while 
also being deployed under significant uncertainties regarding the technology and its commercial 
prospects. My dissertation seeks to address this gap in the literature by examining what drives 
firms to purchase real options to preserve flexibility in their commitment decisions in patenting 
strategies.  
 
Three legal “shocks” to the U.S. patent system 
Methodologically, I leverage three different changes in U.S. patent law to robustly deal 
with potential endogeneity concerns. In my first empirical study (Chapter 2), I use the American 
Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), which went into effect on November 29, 2000. The AIPA 
introduced an 18-month publication rule, whereby the U.S. patent system discloses information 
contained in a patent application to the public at 18 months from the priority date
1
, regardless of 
whether a patent eventually issues or not. In the past legal framework, the U.S. patent system 
disclosed information contained in a patent application to the public at the time of patent 
issuance. Since an average patent application takes 2 to 3 years to issue a patent (e.g., Allison & 
Lemley, 2000; Popp et al., 2004), the AIPA resulted in substantially faster disclosure of 
technologies pursuing patent protection compared with the past legal framework in the U.S. 
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The AIPA was enacted in part to mitigate the problem of “submarine patenting” (Lemley 
& Moore, 2004), whereby patent applicants keep patents pending and secret until others in the 
industry make significant investments in the technology, in order to hold them up by bringing an 
infringement suit. The legislation was first introduced as a result of negotiations between the U.S. 
and Japan in August 1994 under the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Schrader, 
1997). Given that the AIPA was enacted in November 29, 1999, as part of a $390 billion 
omnibus spending bill (Ergenzinger, 2006), endogeneity concerns for the legislative change are 
mitigated to some extent.    
In my second empirical study (Chapter 3), I use the America Invents Act (AIA), which 
went into effect on March 16, 2013. The AIA introduced a first-to-file patenting system to the 
U.S. and began to entitle only the first-inventor-who-files to a patent on an invention. In the past 
legal framework, the U.S. had a first-to-invent patenting system, which entitled the inventor who 
could prove that he/she was the first to invent an invention to the patent right. Thus, the AIA 
effectively increased the payoff of prompt filing of a patent. 
The transition to a first-to-file system was aimed at making the patent system “globally 
competitive” by reducing a large volume of litigation and interference proceedings which 
determine who is the true inventor and thus has the patent right to the invention under a first-to-
invent system (Hasford, 2017). The legislation was first proposed in 2005 and took years to be 
passed due to competing interests. The eventual passage of the legislation was possible due in 
part to the fact that strong advocates of a first-to-invent system had retired, passed away, or 
dropped their opposition to a first-to-file system (Wayne et al., 2012). This observation mitigates 
to some extent endogeneity concerns for the implementation of a first-to-file system in the U.S. 
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In my third empirical study (Chapter 4), I use the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which went into effect on June 8, 1995 through the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA). Negotiated at the 1994 GATT, the TRIPS requires 
GATT members to adopt the patent term of 20 years from the priority date (Schrader, 1997). The 
U.S. agreed to become bound by the agreement by enacting the URAA. In the past legal 
framework, U.S. patent term was measured 17 years from the date of patent issuance. A new 20-
year term incentivizes patent applicants to push for early issuance. Thus, the amendment of 
patent term was aimed at mitigating the problem of submarine patenting in addition to 
harmonizing the U.S. patent system with that of other countries. Both of these objectives were 
subsequently shared by an 18-month publication rule of the AIPA.   
At the same time, patentees that filed during the interim period between the enactment 
and effective date of TRIPS were provided the two discrete choices between patent terms under 
the old or new rule. This transition rule implies that patentees could extend patent term by filing 
during the interim period relative to after the effective date of TRIPS. 
 
Provisional patent applications         
In my first two empirical studies (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), I measure firms’ purchase of 
real options by their use of provisional patent applications. Provisional applications were 
introduced in the U.S. by the URAA along with a new 20-year patent term. Provisional 
applications are informal applications (which do not require the drafting of formal claims) 
whereby firms establish a priority date for an invention and receive one year within which they 
must file a regular application to continue with securing the patent right (Migliorini, 2007). If a 
firm does not file a regular application within the one year, the earlier filed provisional 
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application is effectively abandoned. Moreover, information contained in that provisional 
application is kept secret since the patent office does not examine provisional applications until 
after inventors file regular applications claiming priority to them. Therefore, I posit that 
provisional applications can be viewed as real options on patents (see Chapter 3). Alternatively, 
conditional on a firm starting the patenting process, provisional applications can be viewed as 
real options on secrecy (see Chapter 2), which is a mutually exclusive appropriability mechanism 
to patents (Graham & Somaya, 2004). 
Table 1.1 compares the filing fees for regular and provisional applications during the 
sample period used in my dissertation. The filing fee for provisional applications is much lower 
than that for regular applications. The filing fees have changed over time, even within the 
respective sample period in the two chapters. While the minor changes in filing fees may raise 
concerns for my analyses examining firms’ use of provisional applications relative to regular 
applications, these concerns are effectively addressed by using a difference-in-differences (DID) 
design
2
 in the two chapters.         
We have seen a steady increase in the use of provisional applications since their 
introduction. Figure 1.1 shows the number of provisional applications filed during the period 
1998-2014. While the number of provisional applications filed in 1998 was 41,622, we see that 
169,173 provisional applications were filed in 2014. The number has more than tripled over the 
period. Furthermore, the growth of provisional applications is also notable relative to the number 
of regular applications filed; we see that the ratio of provisional applications to regular 
applications has increased by 68.2% over the period (0.173 to 0.291). 
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 The changes in filing fees apply to both the treatment group of inventions pursuing only U.S. protection and the 
control group of inventions pursuing foreign protection. A DID design allows us to estimate the net effect by 
subtracting the effect in the control group from that in the treatment group, thus strictly controlling for the potential 




Overview of the empirical studies in my dissertation 
Despite a large body of research on real options for value creation in innovation, how 
firms use real options reasoning to strategize among alternative value appropriation choices 
under uncertainty has received relatively little scrutiny. In Chapter 2, I seek to examine the 
patent-secrecy choice as an exemplar of the value of such real options in appropriability 
strategies. As a primary hypothesis, I propose that the greater the risk of technology disclosure to 
rivals due to patenting, the more likely that firms purchase “secrecy options” to retain secrecy of 
inventions while attempting to patent them. I employ a difference-in-differences research design 
that leverages the American Inventors Protection Act, a quasi-exogenous change in U.S. patent 
law that resulted in faster disclosure of technologies pursuing patent protection, and show that 
firms were more likely to purchase secrecy options (by filing provisional patent applications) for 
patents affected by faster disclosure. Further, I find that this effect was quite large, and more 
pronounced for smaller firms and more novel technologies. These findings point to the promise 
of a new stream of research at the intersection of real options theory and appropriability 
strategies. 
The patent system rewards inventors on a first-past-the-post principle, as epitomized by 
the first-to-file rule that entitles only the first-inventor-who-files to a patent on an invention. In 
Chapter 3, I examine how firms strategically respond to the patent racing incentives created by 
such a rule, and propose that they may do so by capitalizing on real options – represented by 
provisional applications – in the patenting process. I employ a difference-in-differences design 
that leverages the transition of the U.S. patent system from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file 
system following the America Invents Act, and show that firms were more likely to file 
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provisional applications (as real options on future patent applications) under a first-to-file system. 
Furthermore, I show that the magnitude of this effect depended on contingencies such as the 
firm’s technological dominance, industry concentration and patent effectiveness. These findings 
highlight the value of a real options lens for studying patent strategy. 
Patent term has been a significant topic in the appropriability strategy literature and 
throughout the history of U.S. patent law. However, a dearth of empirical work centers on how 
various invention attributes impact firms’ preferences for the length of patent term. In Chapter 4, 
I seek to addresses this gap in the literature by examining firms’ revealed preference to file a 
patent immediately before (relative to after) the U.S. transition from the 17-years-from-issuance 
to 20-years-from-filing patent term, ushered in by TRIPS. I view this choice as firms’ purchase 
of real options in patent term extension and show that patent prosecution uncertainty increases 
the value of these options, among other invention attributes. This study takes an exploratory 





TABLE AND FIGURE 
 
Table 1.1: Filing fees for regular versus provisional applications in my sample period  
($ per application) 
 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 … 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Regular Small  395 380 345 355 370 … 165 165 190 140 140 
Large  790 760 690 710 740 … 330 330 380 280 280 
Provisional Small  75 75 75 75 80 … 110 110 125 130 130 
Large  150 150 150 150 160 … 220 220 250 260 260 
Dissertation  
sample period 
Chapter 2  Chapter 3 
 
Source: The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Federal Register Notices 
 
N.B. An applicant qualified as a small entity pays lower filing fees. The USPTO defines small 
entity as either an individual inventor, a collaboration of individual inventors, a nonprofit 




Figure 1.1: The number of provisional patent applications filed during 1998-2014 
 
Source: The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Annual Reports 
N.B. In computing the ratio, I exclude design applications from regular applications for 
comparison purposes since provisional applications cannot be subsequently filed as 




CHAPTER 2: REAL OPTIONS IN VALUE APPROPRIATION: 





How do firms profit from innovation is a fundamental research question in the 
technology strategy literature, which has long recognized the significant challenges posed by 
technological uncertainty for capturing value from innovation (e.g., Teece, 1986). Value 
appropriation strategies to capture profits from innovation are widely understood to be critical 
for firms (e.g., Lepak et al., 2007; Nordhaus, 1969; Teece, 1986; Scherer, 1965), while also 
being deployed under significant uncertainties regarding the technology and its commercial 
prospects. Real options reasoning (ROR), a theoretical lens that has informed how firms make 
strategic decisions under uncertainty (Hackbarth & Johnson, 2015; Li et al., 2007; Trigeorgis & 
Reuer, 2017), has also offered important insights into how value-creating R&D investments can 
be staged to balance strategic commitment and innovation-related uncertainties (e.g., Hurry et al., 
1992; Mitchel & Hamilton, 1988; McGrath, 1997; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004). However, despite 
the large body of research on real options related to the creation of value through innovation, 
how ROR can inform firms’ decision-making in value appropriation strategies has received 
relatively little scrutiny. In this paper, I highlight the value of a real options lens for 
appropriability strategies by examining the choice between patents and secrecy, and explaining 
when and why firms take advantage of real options to delay this choice in the patenting process 
(in essence retaining a “secrecy option” while obtaining a patent).  
Research on real options in the IP literature suffers from the same lacunae affecting the 
strategic real options literature generally; namely, a lack of research on how firms choose among 
alternative IP rights as real options in their value appropriability strategies. For example, prior 
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research has studied the exercise of IP-related real options to shed light on the value distribution 
of underlying inventions (Pakes, 1986), and examined the acquisition of IP rights as a real option 
on the future value that may be created from an invention (McGrath & Nerkar, 2004; Nerkar et 
al., 2007; Ziedonis, 2007). Examining firms’ strategic choice of IP rights with a real options lens 
is valuable because there are substantial ex ante uncertainties – technological, commercial, 
and/or legal – that firms face when acquiring IP rights. ROR enables firms to avoid making 
costly commitments before these uncertainties are resolved, and thus preserves valuable future 
decision rights (e.g., Li et al., 2007; Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017). At the same time, examining the 
patent-secrecy choice using a real options lens departs from the conventional static view of the 
choice between alternative IP rights (e.g., Horstmann et al., 1985; Levin et al., 1987), and instead 
sheds light on how firms may manage such decision making over time (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; 
Graham, 2004) while awaiting the resolution of important uncertainties.  
Thus, the core research question addressed in the current paper is: what drives firms to 
acquire real options that allow them to delay their choice between two mutually exclusive IP 
mechanisms, namely secrecy and patents. While patenting necessarily vitiates secrecy due to the 
enabling disclosure requirement enshrined in patent law
3
 (Graham & Somaya, 2004) and fosters 
spillovers to rivals (Mansfield et al., 1981), significant ex ante uncertainties surrounding 
patenting (e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, 2005; Pakes, 1986; Somaya, 2012) may deter firms from 
committing to either mechanism before such uncertainties are resolved. Firms may seek to deal 
with this fundamental problem by purchasing real options that allow them to hedge between 
secrecy and patents. I refer to these options as “secrecy options” conditional on pursuing patent 
protection, and define them as choices whereby firms put a stake in the ground for patent 
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 A patent application must contain a written description of the technology, which enables any person skilled in the 
art to reproduce it (35 USC § 112(a)). 
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protection while preserving the right to withdraw from the patenting process without affecting 
their ability to retain secrecy of their technologies. Secrecy options are analogous to financial 
call options in that, at a relatively small cost, firms keep the upside potential of acquiring a patent 
right on an invention while at the same time limiting the downside risk of losing secrecy. 
A firm’s purchase of a secrecy option, the core phenomenon of interest in this study, is 
measured by the filing of a provisional patent application (hereinafter provisional), which allows 
the firm to lock in the priority date
4
 for potential patent protection. A provisional then offers one 
year within which the patent applicant must file a regular (i.e., non-provisional) application with 
claims covering the same technology in order to continue with acquiring the patent right. 
Alternatively, a patent applicant may choose to back out of the patenting process and retain 
secrecy of its technology simply by doing nothing past the one-year milestone. Thus, a 
provisional enables a firm to gain a foothold in patent protection and simultaneously limits the 
downside risk of losing secrecy due to patenting – that is, to hedge its bets between patenting and 
secrecy (Lazar & Lohse, 2015). 
In this study, I draw on real options theory to propose that the greater the risk of 
information disclosure to rivals due to patenting, the more likely that firms purchase secrecy 
options. Furthermore, I propose that in the presence of a heightened risk of information 
disclosure secrecy options are more valuable for (a) smaller firms, which often lack other value 
appropriation mechanisms to offset the loss of secrecy (e.g., Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Katila 
et al., 2008), and for (b) more novel technologies, which have higher option value because they 
are associated with greater uncertainty (Ziedonis, 2007). I overcome potential empirical 
challenges in exogenously measuring information disclosure through patents by leveraging the 
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American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), a quasi-exogenous change in U.S. patent law that 
went into effect on November 29, 2000 and caused substantially faster disclosure of technologies 
pursuing patent protection through a new 18-month publication rule. Moreover, this change 
primarily affected patent applicants that were seeking domestic U.S.-only protection, when 
compared with applicants that were also seeking patent protection in other countries that already 
had 18-month publication requirements of their own. I take advantage of these differences 
between patent applicants in a differences-in-differences empirical design, which allows stronger 
identification of my hypothesized effects. The empirical analyses provide support for all 
hypotheses at economically and statistically significant levels. 
The main contributions of this study are three-fold. First, it informs the real options 
literature by shedding light on what drives firms to acquire real options in value appropriation 
choices, in contrast with the literature’s prior focus on choices related to investments for value 
creation. Second, the study contributes to research on appropriability strategies by showing how 
firms may manage the choice between the alternative IP rights of patents and secrecy over time, 
departing from the conventional static view. Finally, the study makes empirical contributions by 
employing a novel dataset on provisional patent applications and designing a robust test 
leveraging a quasi-exogenous shock, in the analyses of firms’ purchase of secrecy options, which 
may depend on the speed of technology disclosure through patenting.    
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Speed of disclosure through patenting 
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Patenting requires firms to make the irreversible commitment of giving up secrecy. The 
“enabling disclosure”
5
 requirement for patenting stipulates that a patentee must disclose the 
technology to the public in exchange for the patent right (e.g., Mazzoleni & Nelson, 1998). 
Despite the patent system’s aim to promote the diffusion of technologies, firms seeking to 
appropriate value from their innovations may be faced with the critical risks of disclosure 
through patenting (e.g., Modigliani, 1999; Watase, 2002). Because patenting facilitates 
information disclosure, rivals may be able to invent around technologies earlier and at lower 
costs (Mansfield et al., 1981). Such imitation risks make commitments to patenting costly (e.g., 
Cohen et al., 2000; Sichelman & Graham, 2010).   
Meanwhile, patenting involves significant ex ante uncertainties that will typically only be 
resolved over time (e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, 2005; Pakes, 1986; Somaya, 2012). Firms often file 
patents at early exploratory stages in their technology development, not assured of the long-term 
value of these patents (Pakes, 1986). For example, firms may be unsure of whether they are 
capable of making products with their patents and/or whether there will be markets for the 
products. Firms may be also unsure of whether their patents will survive the risks of being 
invalidated by rivals (Lemley & Shapiro, 2005; Shapiro, 2003). In addition to these technological, 
commercial, and legal uncertainties, there may be other uncertainties which span the 
patentability of the technology and/or the amount of time that takes for rivals to imitate the 
technology (e.g., Friedman et al., 1991; Mansfield et al., 1981). Taken altogether, ex ante 
uncertainties exist in the value of patents relative to the value of secrecy for the protection of the 
focal technology.   
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art to reproduce it (35 USC § 112(a)). 
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As a key driver of ROR, uncertainty critically informs the tension between commitment 
and flexibility in strategic choices (e.g., Ghemawat, 1991; Smit & Trigeorgis, 2004; Trigeorgis & 
Reuer, 2017). In the context of this study, because of ex ante uncertainties, a firm may seek to 
avoid making strong commitments to patenting before being assured of the value of patents 
relative to that of secrecy inasmuch as these two IP mechanisms are incompatible for the 
protection of the single technology (Graham & Somaya, 2004). Thus, the firm may choose to 
purchase a secrecy option while entering into the patenting process. 
The extent to which technology disclosure to rivals through patenting negatively affects 
the focal firm may depend on the speed of such disclosure. Ceteris paribus, faster disclosure 
facilitated by patenting can lead to far more negative consequences by allowing rivals to imitate 
technologies more rapidly. Not only does faster disclosure make the irreversible commitment of 
giving up secrecy more costly for the focal firm, it also requires the commitment be made earlier 
before uncertainties are resolved. Therefore, I propose that faster disclosure of technologies by 
the patent system will make secrecy options more valuable for the protection of these 
technologies. With faster disclosure, firms may prefer to make weaker commitments to patenting 
by purchasing secrecy options rather than make full-blown commitments directly. Hence, my 
main hypothesis:  
 
H1. The faster the information about a technology is disclosed as a result of patenting, the more 
likely that a firm purchases a secrecy option. 
 
Secrecy options and small firms   
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Firm size impacts decision making in IP strategies since it relates to the availability of 
resources to the firm (e.g., Arundel, 2001; Sichelman & Graham, 2010). Arundel (2001) uses 
European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) and finds that small firms considered secrecy 
more important relative to patents than did large firms. Sichelman and Graham’s (2010) analyses 
of the Berkeley Patent Survey show that commitments to patenting can be perceived more costly 
by small than large firms not only because of the high costs of acquiring and enforcing the patent 
right but also because of the risks of imitation by others, to which small firms are more 
vulnerable (e.g., Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Katila et al., 2008). Thus, in the baseline, secrecy 
options will be more valuable for smaller firms which choose to enter into the patenting process. 
Furthermore, faster disclosure of technologies by the patent system may affect smaller 
firms more negatively. Small firms may have difficulty competing on other value appropriation 
mechanisms that can offset the loss of secrecy. On the one hand, small firms lack complementary 
resources for commercializing technologies (e.g., Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Teece, 1986). 
Faster disclosure of the technology of a small firm will facilitate large firms inventing around the 
technology earlier and commercializing the non-infringing solutions more easily with their 
greater complementary resources. Even if firms exactly imitated (as opposed to inventing around) 
the technology due to faster disclosure, the small firm might not be capable of enforcing the 
patent right because of prohibitively high legal costs. On the other hand, small firms may also 
lack lead time advantages and thus can be outpaced by large firms easily. Large firms may 
plausibly patent around more rapidly the technology of the small firm based on faster disclosure, 
preempting technological spaces which would have been strategically important to the small firm.   
Based on the preceding logic, I posit that secrecy options are more valuable for smaller 
firms when faster disclosure takes place. Prior research on ROR suggests that the option value 
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depends on the amount of downside risk that can be curtailed by the use of the option (Dixit & 
Pindyck, 1994). With faster disclosure, full-blown commitments to patenting may lead to greater 
negative consequences to smaller firms. These risks can be effectively mitigated by purchasing 
secrecy options while entering into the patenting process. Thus, I propose the following 
contingency hypothesis: 
 
H2. The faster the information about a technology is disclosed as a result of patenting, the more 
likely that a firm purchases a secrecy option when the firm is smaller in size. 
 
Secrecy options in patenting and invention novelty 
Further insights from real options theory indicate that greater uncertainty increases the 
option value since uncertainty determines the downside risk that can be reduced by avoiding 
making strong commitments (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). A technology that is more novel to the 
world may be associated with greater uncertainty in the evaluation of the technology (Ziedonis, 
2007) and therefore in the choice between patents and secrecy for the protection of the 
technology. Greater uncertainty may arise from any factors that affect a firm’s decision calculus 
in patent-secrecy choices: the value of the technology, the costs of acquiring a patent, the length 
of time that it takes for rivals to imitate the technology, the patentability of the technology, etc. 
(Friedman et al., 1991). Thus, secrecy options as mechanisms to hedge bets between patents and 
secrecy will be more valuable for the protection of more novel technologies.  
Moreover, faster disclosure of technologies through patenting may affect more novel 
technologies more negatively because of the associated greater uncertainty. Faster disclosure, or 
earlier vitiation of secrecy, implies that a firm must make commitments earlier to either patenting 
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or secrecy. The earlier foreclosure of the choices may be more detrimental for the protection of 
more novel technologies since uncertainty is only partially resolved leading up to the due date 
although these technologies are associated with greater uncertainty to begin with. Thus, firms are 
susceptible to making erroneous choices between patents and secrecy. By contrast, for less novel 
technologies, which are associated with less uncertainty, firms may not gain as much by waiting 
before making commitments. Faster disclosure may not have as large an impact on these 
technologies.  
Taken altogether, I posit that secrecy options are more valuable for more novel 
technologies when faster disclosure takes place. With faster disclosure, full-blown commitments 
to patenting may lead to greater negative consequences for the technology when it is more novel 
and thus associated with greater uncertainty. A firm will be more likely to purchase a secrecy 
option for that technology since the net benefit of awaiting the resolution of uncertainty plausibly 
relative to making costly commitments to patenting directly is greater than that for a less novel 
technology. Therefore, the following contingency hypothesis:   
 
H3. The faster the information about a technology is disclosed as a result of patenting, the more 
likely that a firm purchases a secrecy option when the technology is newer to the world. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Dependent variable: choice to file a provisional patent application 
The dependent variable of this study is a firm’s choice to purchase a secrecy option for 
the focal technology when initially entering into the patenting process. This choice is measured 
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by an indicator variable which denotes a firm’s filing of a provisional as opposed to a regular 
application (= 1 if the patent was initially filed as a provisional; = 0 if as a regular application).  
It is noteworthy that firms do not file a provisional all the time: a firm files a provisional 
only when it perceives the existence of ex ante uncertainties in the value of acquiring the patent 
right relative to that of retaining secrecy for the protection of the focal technology. In the absence 
of these uncertainties, a firm would either (a) make full-blown commitments to patenting directly 
(by filing a regular application and having the patent issue in a timely manner) or (b) retain 
secrecy of the technology (by staying outside the patent system). There are significant costs to 
acquiring the patent right through filing a provisional and then filing a regular application within 
one year, compared with filing a regular application directly. First, the overall monetary costs of 
patent prosecution until issuance increase since a provisional requires a separate filing fee from a 
regular application. Second, the opportunity costs may increase since the provisional route 
generally delays the time of patent issuance – after which the patentee is able to enforce his/her 
right against others – because the technology is not examined by the patent office until after a 
regular application is filed.     
It is also equally noteworthy that neither does the firm file a regular application all the 
time. Although regular applications also allow firms to back out of the patenting process without 
harming secrecy of the technologies until the time of mandatory disclosure, these secrecy options 
provided by regular applications are accessible at much higher costs than those provided by 
provisionals. First, filing provisionals does not require drafting claims and/or conforming to 
other stylistic formalities (Migliorini, 2007), which saves legal costs significantly. In fact, patent 
attorneys drafting provisionals charge on average a third of what they would charge for drafting 
regular applications (Lazar & Lohse, 2015). Second, the filing fee of provisionals is lower than 
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that of regular applications. Third, provisionals do not require any further actions for 
withdrawing from the patenting process (since going past one year suffices), whereas regular 
applications require the timely submission of official requests for abandonment
6
 (USPTO, 2016). 
Therefore, if a firm was to hedge its bets between patents and secrecy under uncertainties, it 
might as well do so by filing a provisional instead of a regular application. 
 
Empirical context 
Historically, the U.S. patent system disclosed the information contained in a patent 
application at the time of patent issuance. Thus, when the patent happened to be disapproved, the 
applicant was able to protect his/her technology with the alternative IP mechanism of secrecy 
(Watase, 2002). Contrary to the U.S., other countries had an 18-month publication rule whereby 
the information contained in a patent application was disclosed to the public at 18 months from 
the priority date, regardless of whether the patent issues or not. This early disclosure system 
aimed at facilitating the diffusion of knowledge and preventing the duplication of R&D by other 
firms (Johnson & Popp, 2003).  
The U.S. enacted the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA) on November 29, 1999 
to reconcile its patent system with those of other countries as negotiated with Japan under Global 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The AIPA went into effect on November 29, 2000 and 
implemented the same 18-month publication rule in the U.S. Given that an average patent 
application takes 2 to 3 years to issue a patent (e.g., Allison & Lemley, 2000; Popp et al., 2004), 
the implementation of an 18-month publication rule resulted in substantially faster disclosure of 
                                                          
6
 The USPTO suggests the request for abandonment be delivered to examiners more than four weeks prior to the 
projected date of disclosure. 
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technologies pursuing patent protection compared with the past legal framework in the U.S. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates this point graphically.  
Furthermore, the fact that other countries had already been enforcing an 18-month 
publication rule prior to the U.S. transition provides identification strategies for obtaining the 
control group of inventions pursuing foreign as well as U.S. protection, and the treatment group 
of inventions pursuing only U.S. protection.  
 
Method 
In my analyses of what drives firms to purchase secrecy options when initially entering 
into the patenting process, I employ a difference-in-differences (DID) design leveraging the 
AIPA, a quasi-exogenous change in U.S. patent law. I examine whether a pre- and post-AIPA 
change in the likelihood of filing a provisional for the treatment group is significantly greater 
than that for the control group. A DID design controls for any effects that might have been 
caused by variables which are common to both the treatment and the control groups (Card & 
Kruger, 1993). 
I employ linear probability models with robust standard errors. I use linear models 
instead of the non-linear models of probit and logit because the goal of this study is to investigate 
the causal effect of AIPA on the filing of a provisional relative to a regular application rather 
than forecast probabilities. Further, because the true conditional expectation function is unknown, 
linear probability models work better than arbitrarily chosen non-linear models (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2009).   
 Taken altogether, I estimate the following linear probability models on a DID design 
(Wooldridge, 2010):  
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𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝐵 + 𝛿0𝑑2 + 𝛿1𝑑𝐵 ∗ 𝑑2 + 𝑥′𝜃 + 𝑢, 
where 𝑦 is the choice to file a provisional, 𝑑2 a dummy variable that indicates a post-AIPA 
patent, 𝑑𝐵 a dummy variable that indicates the treatment group of patents pursuing only 
domestic protection, and 𝑥 a vector of other explanatory variables. The coefficient of interest, is 
the DID estimator 𝛿1, which is estimated by 𝛿1̂ = (?̅?𝐵,2 − ?̅?𝐵,1) −  (?̅?𝐴,2 − ?̅?𝐴,1). 
 
Data 
I employ U.S. patent data on utility patents which establish their own priority date, 
namely “original” as opposed to “continuing” patents (Lemley & Moore, 2004), since 
provisionals by law cannot be filed claiming priority to previously filed applications. I then keep 
track of whether the focal patent was initially filed as a provisional or a regular application.  
I focus my analyses on those patents that were filed November 28, 1998 through 
November 28, 1999 (pre-AIPA subsample) or November 29, 2001 through November 29, 2002 
(post-AIPA subsample). I exclude the patents filed one year before and after the AIPA effective 
date November 29, 2000 in order to account for potential bias arising from firms gradually 
adjusting to the new incentives created by the legislative change.  
In this sample I keep only those patents that took no more than 4 years to issue (i.e., grant 
lag ≤ 4 years). This procedure was aimed at making the pre- and post-AIPA subsamples more 
comparable since they need to be matched with NBER data, which only covers patents granted 
through 2006: but for this procedure, a larger proportion of the post-AIPA patents would remain 
unmatched because they tend to have issued later than the pre-AIPA patents. I then exclude 
“untreated” patents, those post-AIPA patents that pursued only domestic protection and opted 
out of an 18-month publication rule (Graham & Hegde, 2015).  
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Lastly, I match this final sample of 249,759 patents to Compustat data on the algorithm 
provided by the NBER USPTO-Compustat correspondence file (Bessen, 2009).   
     
Explanatory variables 
Post-AIPA: a dummy indicating whether the patent was initially filed after the AIPA effective 
date November 29, 2000   
Domestic protection: a dummy indicating whether the patent belongs to the treatment group of 
patents pursuing only domestic protection 
The interaction of these two variables represents a dummy indicating a post-AIPA patent 
that pursues only domestic protection. 
Size: measured in two ways, (a) the (logged) number of patents filed by a patentee during the 
sample period, based on prior research that has found a strong positive correlation between this 
measure and firm size (e.g., Scherer, 1965) and (b) (logged) total assets for the compustat 
subsample 
Novelty: measured by the “originality” score based on backward citations (Trajtenberg et al., 
1997), computed as 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗
2𝑛𝑖
𝑗 , where 𝑠𝑖𝑗 denotes the percentage of citations 
made by patent i that belong to patent class j, out of 𝑛𝑖 patent classes. This Herfindahl 
concentration index based measure will be high [low] if the patent cites prior patents which 
belong to a wide [narrow] set of technologies.  
I control for the following variables: 
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Technology categories: a set of 6 indicator variables denoting each of the 6 technology 
categories
7
 the patent belongs to: chemical (12.8% of patents in the sample); computers and 
communications (22.4%); drugs and medical (8.6%); electrical and electronic (22.9%); 
mechanical (17.3%); others (16%)    
Number of forward citations: the patent value measured by the number of forward citations (e.g., 
Abrams et al., 2013; Hall et al., 2005), adjusted for truncation bias with technology class-year 
fixed effects  
Number of backward citations: the patent value measured by the number of backward citations 
(e.g., Harhoff et al., 2003) 
Number of claims: the number of claims as a proxy for the complexity of the patent and the 
likelihood of legal disputes (Harhoff et al., 2003; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2001) 
To implement a DID design, I use interaction variables. The coefficient on the interaction 
of Post-AIPA and Domestic protection shows firms’ purchase of secrecy options as a result of 
AIPA. I further interact this interaction variable with the measures of size and novelty 
respectively, creating three-way interactions. Requisite two-way interactions are also included 
wherever the three-way interactions are used.       
 
RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics illustrated in Figure 2.2 suggests that based on my sample, the 
mean rate of using a provisional varies by the patentee type and industry, and whether the patent 
pursues foreign protection. The most frequent users of provisionals were those classified as small 
                                                          
7 
This aggregate NBER classification scheme was developed by Hall et al. (2001) based on the more than 500 





 by the USPTO (15.23%) – particularly U.S. individuals (15.5%) – and the drugs and 
medical industry (17.07%). In addition, provisionals were on average used more often for 
technologies pursuing only domestic protection (13.19%) than those pursuing foreign as well as 
domestic protection (8.08%).      
Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics of explanatory variables by pre- and post-AIPA 
and the control and treatment groups. 
As a preliminary step, I investigate whether a change in the probability of purchasing a 
secrecy option (i.e., filing a provisional as opposed to a regular application) for the treatment 
group was on average any different from that for the control group. Figure 2.3 shows that there 
was a much larger increase in the use of provisionals for the treatment than control group, after 
AIPA went into effect.  
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2.2 shows that the mean probability of filing a 
provisional increased post-AIPA for each of the four groups: (a) control-noncompustat; (b) 
control-compustat; (c) treatment-noncompustat; and (d) treatment-compustat. Most notably, the 
treatment-noncompustat group experienced an 89.6% mean probability increase in relative terms 
(from 0.125 to 0.237). The treatment-compustat group experienced a 33.3% increase (from 0.078 
to 0.104), which is the second largest. These are larger increases than what was experienced by 
the control group (+21.1% in control-noncompustat and +18.2% in control-compustat). 
Moreover, relative percentage increases in the mean probability were greater for non-compustat 
than compustat applicants in both the treatment and the control groups. Thus, it appears that 
small firms on average valued provisionals more than large firms as AIPA went into effect. 
  
                                                          
8
 The USPTO defines small entity as either an individual inventor, a collaboration of individual inventors, a 
nonprofit organization, or a company with fewer than 500 employees. 
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Hypothesis testing for H1 
Then, I turn to my main analyses using a DID design, reported in Table 2.3. The DID 
estimate in the full sample suggests that the probability of purchasing a secrecy option for the 
treatment sample increased significantly more than that for the control sample as AIPA went into 
effect (β=0.049, p-value<0.01). In numeric terms, firms were 6.5% (0.016+0.049=0.065) more 
likely to file a provisional for the treatment group technologies, whereas firms were 1.6% more 
likely to file a provisional for the control group technologies. The DID estimate is equivalent to a 
striking 45.8% increase in the filing of a provisional post-AIPA relative to the mean rate pre-
AIPA (0.049/0.107=0.458). These findings strongly corroborate H1 that the faster the 
information about a technology is disclosed as a result of patenting, the more likely that a firm 
purchases a secrecy option. 
The second column in Table 2.3 reports the impact of AIPA on firms’ filing of 
provisionals for the compustat subsample. The DID estimate suggests that although compustat 
firms increased their purchase of secrecy options post-AIPA (β=0.009, p-value<0.05), the effect 
is smaller in both magnitude and significance than non-compustat firms as inferred from the 
effect in the full sample. This result hints at size effects hypothesized in H2, which will be 
examined shortly. 
 
Robustness check for H1 (1) 
Before I move onto the testing of H2 and H3, I conduct robustness checks for the testing 
of H1. I examine how the filing of a provisional changes over time by estimating Model (1) 
using a set of quarterly dummies instead of the single time period indicator. 
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Figure 2.4 shows that firms were much more likely to purchase a secrecy option post-
AIPA for the treatment than the control group. There was a 46.7% increase in the filing of a 
provisional post-AIPA relative to the mean rate pre-AIPA (0.05/0.107=0.467). This number is 
comparable to what has been suggested by the DID coefficient of the full sample column in 
Table 2.3. This finding is strongly corroborative of H1. 
 
Robustness check for H1 (2) 
I perform coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Iacus, King, & Porro, 2012) to control for 
potential selection into the treatment and control groups. Firms’ choice to pursue foreign or 
domestic protection for their inventions can be driven by underlying invention characteristics, 
which may also drive the choice to file provisionals for these inventions. CEM addresses these 
selection concerns by making the treatment and control groups more similar in terms of the 
empirical distributions of invention characteristics, and allows the more precise estimation of the 
causal effect.  
I perform CEM on four variables: (a) the number of forward citations, (b) the number of 
claims, (c) the number of backward citations, and (d) invention novelty. Prior research 
recognizes that these invention characteristics are correlated with technological opportunities 
and/or the value of technologies. These variables are also presumably correlated with firms’ 
choice to pursue foreign or domestic protection and further with their choice to file provisionals. 
Table 2.4 shows the results of CEM. 
The results of DID analyses on this matched dataset, reported in Table 2.5, offer strong 
support for H1. Moreover, the magnitude of DID estimates increased relative to what we have 




Hypothesis testing for H2 and H3 
I test for H2 and H3 by interpreting the coefficients on the respective three-way 
interactions, which are the DID estimates of interest. For the easier interpretation of these 
interactions, I chart out the predicted probabilities of the firms’ purchasing a secrecy option with 
respect to size and novelty. These probabilities are computed using Model (4) with the full 
sample.  
In Table 2.6, the DID estimates involving firm size were negative significant for the full 
sample in both Model (2) (β=-0.014, p-value<0.01) and Model (4) (β=-0.013, p-value<0.01), 
which suggests that AIPA increased the filing of a provisional more sharply for smaller firms. 
Moreover, the effect was greater in magnitude for the non-compustat than compustat subsample 
as can be inferred by comparing the compustat subsample (Model (2) β=-0.010, p-value<0.01; 
Model (4) β=-0.008, p-value<0.01) with the full sample.  
Furthermore, in order to mitigate potential concerns for the size variable, measured by the 
(logged) number of patents filed by the patentee during the sample period, I supplement it with 
another proxy for size. For the compustat subsample, I further measure firm size by (logged) 
total assets. As reported in the third column under Model (2) and Model (4), even with this 
alternative measure, I find the same results in support of H2 (Model (2) β=-0.007, p-value<0.01; 
Model (4) β=-0.006, p-value<0.1). 
Figure 2.5 shows that the negative impact of firm size on the predicted probability of 
filing a provisional was more pronounced for the treatment group post-AIPA, as suggested by its 
steeper slope than that of the pre-AIPA treatment group. At one standard deviation below the 
mean size, if the invention was in the treatment group, the probability of filing a provisional 
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would be 0.1294 pre-AIPA and 0.2318 post-AIPA (=79% more likely post-AIPA). Meanwhile, 
if an invention was in the control group, the probability would be 0.0982 pre-AIPA and 0.1274 
post-AIPA (=30% more likely post-AIPA). These findings support H2 that the faster the 
information about a technology is disclosed as a result of patenting, the more likely that a firm 
purchases a secrecy option when the firm is smaller in size. 
Finally, I examine the three-way interaction involving novelty, reported in Table 2.6. The 
DID estimate was positive significant for the full sample in Model (3) (β=0.045, p-value<0.01), 
which suggests that AIPA increased the filing of a provisional more sharply for firms with more 
novel inventions, in support of H3. In Model (4), the full model which includes both size and 
novelty variables, the DID estimate is positive significant for the full sample (β=0.019, p-
value<0.1) but insignificant for the compustat subsample. This insignificant coefficient once size 
is controlled for suggests that invention novelty is correlated with firm size in predicting firms’ 
choice to file a provisional. 
 Figure 2.6 shows that the positive impact of novelty on the predicted probability of filing 
a provisional is more pronounced for the treatment group post-AIPA, as suggested by its steeper 
slope than that of the pre-AIPA treatment group. At one standard deviation above the mean 
novelty, if an invention was in the treatment group, the probability of filing a provisional would 
be 0.0982 pre-AIPA and 0.1614 post-AIPA (=64% more likely post-AIPA). In contrast, if an 
invention was in the control group, the probability would be 0.0800 pre-AIPA and 0.0961 post-




Supplementary industry subsample analyses 
In these supplementary analyses, I compare the marginal effect of AIPA across industries. 
The DID analyses reported in Table 2.7 show that all industries except software, and drugs and 
medical significantly increased the filing of a provisional as AIPA went into effect. 
Even though drugs and medical were the most frequent users of provisionals based on the 
average rate of use reported in Figure 2.2, they did not significantly increase the filing of 
provisionals in response to AIPA. This finding may be attributed to strong patent protection 
conferred to this industry (e.g., Anton et al., 2006), which lead to little uncertainty over the value 
of patents relative to that of secrecy; patents are generally perceived as a better IP mechanism. 
Due to little uncertainty, the purchase of a secrecy option did not change by drugs and medical 
firms despite the faster disclosure of technologies induced by AIPA. 
 Likewise, software firms did not increase the use of a provisional post-AIPA, which may 
be attributed to weak patent protection conferred to them (e.g., Miller, 2014). The resulting little 
uncertainty over the value of patents relative to that of secrecy may have led software firms to 
generally perceive secrecy as a better IP mechanism. Further, software patents are by nature 
more complex and thus more difficult to be discovered by rivals than patents in other industries 
(Mulligan & Lee, 2012). Therefore, the incentive to increase the purchase of a secrecy option in 
response to AIPA may have been lower than other industries. 
 
Additional analyses 
 In Table A.1 of Appendix A, I further investigate how various invention attributes – the 
numbers of forward citations, claims, and backward citations – within the firm influence its 
choice to file a provisional application (relative to a regular application) by using linear 
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probability models with assignee fixed effects. I find that these correlates of patent value 
(Harhoff et al., 2003; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004) do not impact the firm’s use of a 
provisional application when there is faster disclosure of inventions due to patenting (i.e., after 
the implementation of AIPA).      
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study examines what drives firms to acquire (purchase) real options in their choices 
of two mutually exclusive IP mechanisms, or secrecy and patents, under uncertainties. I propose 
that the higher the risk of technology disclosure to rivals, the greater the value of “secrecy 
options” in the initial acquisition of the patent right. Empirically, I leverage the enactment of 
AIPA and firms’ use of provisionals, and show that patent applicants exposed to faster disclosure 
of technologies were more likely to purchase secrecy options. Strikingly, the filing of a 
provisional increased by 45.8% after AIPA went into effect. Moreover, consistent with prior 
research on knowledge misappropriation (e.g., Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Katila et al., 2008) 
and IP strategies (e.g., Arundel, 2001; Sichelman & Graham, 2010), I find that the value of 
secrecy options in response to faster disclosure was greater for smaller firms. I also find that the 
option value in response to faster disclosure was greater for more novel technologies, confirming 
the predictions of real options theory (e.g., Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Smit & Trigeorgis, 2004).   
This study seeks to address the gap in the existing literature on real options in the 
innovation landscape, which focuses on the implications of ROR for value creation (e.g., Hurry 
et al., 1992; Mitchel & Hamilton, 1987; McGrath, 1997; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004; Schwartz, 
2004; Schwartz & Moon, 2000). I highlight that ROR informs the drivers of firm heterogeneity 
in the context of not only value creation but also value appropriation. Furthermore, this study is 
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one that makes more accurate valuations of real options, as called for by recent research in 
strategic management (Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017), since it analyzes firms’ purchase of secrecy 
options at the granular, invention level. 
I also contribute to the literature on IP and appropriability strategies by examining how 
firms may manage decision making on the acquisition of IP rights over time. This study 
examines firms’ use of real options to manage uncertainties concerning tradeoffs arising from the 
two mutually exclusive value capture mechanisms of patent protection and secrecy, and thus 
answers recent calls for research on the strategic management of IP rights (e.g., Somaya, 2012). 
My findings have valuable implications for managers seeking to potentially patent technologies 
that differ in their attributes and vulnerability to spillovers to rivals. For example, firms may seek 
to purchase secrecy options more heavily for product innovations, which rivals can reverse 
engineer and invent around more easily than process innovations. Future research can study the 
over-time processes in which firms choose from different value appropriation mechanisms based 
on technology attributes correlated with spillovers to rivals.     
This study also has important policy implications since it shows how patent applicants 
can hedge their bets between secrecy and patents for the protection of the same technology, 
which may potentially hinder the prompt dissemination of knowledge. Nevertheless, this study 
does not argue that firms on average prefer retaining secrecy of technologies to disclosing them 
through patenting. While innovating firms may be faced with conflicting incentives between 
hiding and disclosing technologies (e.g., Clarkson & Toh, 2010; Graham & Hegde, 2015), this 
paper shows that as technologies are disclosed faster on the margin, real options which enable 
firms to hedge bets between secrecy and patent protection become more valuable. Substantial ex 
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ante uncertainties surrounding the value of patent protection relative to the value of secrecy in 
the early stage of innovation processes make the purchase of these options valuable.            
 Finally, I study what drives firms to purchase secrecy options (i.e., file provisionals) 
based on granted patents, and do not study the exercise of these options. We cannot observe what 
provisionals led to the eventual filing of a regular application or the eventual withdrawal from 
the patenting process because they are examined only after a regular application is subsequently 
filed. Although examining the determinants of the purchase of secrecy options is in and of itself 
interesting from both theoretical and practical standpoints, it would have been useful to know 
what happened to the exercise of these options.
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLE 2.1: Summary statistics (N=249,759 patents)   
 
Pre-AIPA foreign (n=92,227 patents) 
 
Post-AIPA foreign (n=91,622 patents) 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
No. of forward citations 1.08 1.727 0 59.98 
 
0.887 1.506 0 49.48 
Chemical 0.153 0.36 0 1 
 
0.139 0.346 0 1 
Computers & Communications 0.214 0.41 0 1 
 
0.209 0.406 0 1 
Drugs & Medical 0.106 0.308 0 1 
 
0.079 0.27 0 1 
Electrical & Electronic 0.212 0.409 0 1 
 
0.252 0.434 0 1 
Mechanical 0.171 0.377 0 1 
 
0.184 0.388 0 1 
Others 0.144 0.351 0 1 
 
0.137 0.344 0 1 
No. of claims 16.942 13.514 1 596 
 
17.759 14.032 1 522 
No. of backward citations 8.74 12.183 0 430 
 
9.829 17.135 0 736 
PostAIPA 0 0 0 0 
 
1 0 1 1 
Size: no. patents per assignee (L) 4.28 2.367 0.693 8.521 
 
4.356 2.361 0.693 8.521 
Size: total assets (L) 9.505 1.839 -0.719 12.647 
 
9.728 1.623 -3.963 13.481 
Novelty 0.527 0.339 0 1 
 
0.535 0.337 0 1 
 
Pre-AIPA domestic (n=42,323 patents) 
 
Post-AIPA domestic (n=23,587 patents) 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
No. of forward citations 1.12 1.594 0 36.107 
 
0.924 1.521 0 43.034 
Chemical 0.078 0.269 0 1 
 
0.079 0.269 0 1 
Computers & Communications 0.248 0.432 0 1 
 
0.281 0.449 0 1 
Drugs & Medical 0.071 0.257 0 1 
 
0.059 0.236 0 1 
Electrical & Electronic 0.212 0.409 0 1 
 
0.236 0.424 0 1 
Mechanical 0.16 0.367 0 1 
 
0.163 0.369 0 1 
Others 0.23 0.421 0 1 
 
0.183 0.387 0 1 
No. of claims 17.071 12.417 1 247 
 
19.637 14.175 1 364 
No. of backward citations 9.483 10.865 0 326 
 
11.571 17.111 0 736 
PostAIPA 0 0 0 0 
 
1 0 1 1 
Size: no. patents per assignee (L) 4.324 2.57 0.693 8.521 
 
4.417 2.626 0.693 8.521 
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TABLE 2.1 (continued)  
 
Size: total assets (L) 9.142 1.957 -0.719 12.625 
 
9.658 1.759 -3.963 12.988 
Novelty 0.517 0.335 0 1 
 
0.541 0.326 0 1 
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  Pre-AIPA Post-AIPA 
 
Pre-AIPA Post-AIPA 
Foreign protection (CON) Mean 0.071 0.086  0.077 0.091 
 
Std. err. (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002) 
 
No. obs. 60,416 58,327  31,811 33,295 
Domestic protection (TRT) 0.125 0.237  0.078 0.104 
 
(0.002) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.003) 
 





TABLE 2.3: Linear probability model for use of a provisional  
 Model (1) 
 Full sample  Compustat  
subsample 
    
No. of forward citations 0.006***  0.003*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001) 
Chemical 0.022***  0.035*** 
 (0.002)  (0.004) 
Computers & Communications -0.022***  -0.026*** 
 (0.002)  (0.003) 
Drugs & Medical 0.078***  0.127*** 
 (0.003)  (0.006) 
Electrical & Electronic -0.012***  -0.015*** 
 (0.002)  (0.003) 
Others 0.017***  0.026*** 
 (0.002)  (0.005) 
No. of claims 0.002***  0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
No. of backward citations 0.002***  0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Domestic protection 0.035***  0.008*** 
 (0.002)  (0.003) 
PostAIPA 0.016***  0.015*** 
 (0.001)  (0.002) 
PostAIPA  * Domestic protection 0.049***  0.009** 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
Constant 0.019***  0.039*** 
 (0.002)  (0.003) 
    
No. obs. 245,283  90,466 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Technology category dummies included, with mechanical as the reference category. 
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TABLE 2.4: Coarsened exact matching (CEM) results 
 
Panel A: Matching results 
 Foreign protection (CON)  Domestic protection (TRT) 
All 183,849  65,910 
Matched 65,721  65,721 
Unmatched 118,128  189 
 
Panel B: Means for treatment and control groups before and after matching 
 No. forward 
citations No. claims 
No. backward 
citations Novelty 
CON before matching 1.029 17.650 10.000 0.531 
TRT before matching 1.078 18.160 10.760 0.525 
Difference -0.049*** -0.508*** -0.754*** 0.006*** 
Mean test t-statistic -6.290 -7.824 -10.770 3.572 
 
CON after matching 1.008 17.510 9.754 0.526 
TRT after matching 1.055 18.070 10.530 0.525 
Difference -0.047*** -0.562*** -0.780*** 0.000 






TABLE 2.5: Coarsened exact matching (CEM) and linear probability model for use of a provisional  
 Full sample  Compustat 
   subsample 
    
Chemical 0.022***  0.028*** 
 (0.003)  (0.005) 
Computers & Communications -0.031***  -0.032*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
Drugs & Medical 0.075***  0.122*** 
 (0.004)  (0.007) 
Electrical & Electronic -0.018***  -0.018*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
Others 0.015***  0.019*** 
 (0.003)  (0.006) 
Domestic protection 0.034***  0.009*** 
 (0.002)  (0.003) 
PostAIPA 0.017***  0.014*** 
 (0.002)  (0.004) 
PostAIPA * Domestic protection 0.054***  0.013** 
 (0.003)  (0.005) 
Constant 0.074***  0.080*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
    
Observations 131,315  50,103 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 




TABLE 2.6: Linear probability model for use of a provisional  
 Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
 Full sample Compustat Compustat  Full sample Compustat  Full sample Compustat Compustat 


















No. of forward citations 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.002***  0.006*** 0.003***  0.006*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Chemical 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.031***  0.021*** 0.033***  0.028*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Computers & Communications 0.007*** -0.004 -0.020***  -0.022*** -0.025***  0.007*** -0.004 -0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Drugs & Medical 0.079*** 0.104*** 0.104***  0.077*** 0.123***  0.076*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.003) (0.007)  (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Electrical & Electronic 0.009*** 0.001 -0.015***  -0.012*** -0.014***  0.010*** 0.001 -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Others 0.004* 0.011** 0.014***  0.018*** 0.028***  0.004 0.012*** 0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
No. of claims 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***  0.002*** 0.001***  0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of backward citations 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  0.002*** 0.001***  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic protection 0.040*** -0.024** -0.079***  0.041*** 0.017***  0.045*** -0.013 -0.068*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.015)  (0.003) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.011) (0.016) 
PostAIPA 0.038*** 0.083*** 0.167***  0.015*** 0.018***  0.039*** 0.091*** 0.172*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.017)  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.010) (0.018) 
Size -0.010*** -0.018*** -0.017***     -0.010*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)     (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
PostAIPA * Domestic protection 0.103*** 0.075*** 0.080***  0.026*** -0.004  0.089*** 0.058*** 0.055* 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.029)  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.010) (0.019) (0.031) 
Domestic protection * Size -0.003*** 0.005*** 0.009***     -0.003*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)     (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
PostAIPA * Size -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.015***     -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.016*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)     (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Domestic protection * PostAIPA * Size -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.007***     -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.006* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)     (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Novelty     0.024*** 0.022***  0.019*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 
     (0.002) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Domestic protection * Novelty     -0.016*** -0.020***  -0.015*** -0.019** -0.017** 
     (0.005) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
PostAIPA * Novelty     0.002 -0.005  0.000 -0.008 -0.003 
     (0.004) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Domestic protection * PostAIPA * Novelty     0.045*** 0.023*  0.019* 0.012 0.013 
     (0.009) (0.012)  (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 0.051*** 0.140*** 0.209***  0.008*** 0.029***  0.044*** 0.133*** 0.201*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.011)  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.007) (0.012) 
           
No. obs. 216,500 90,466 90,449  227,552 84,866  200,680 84,866 84,849 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Technology category dummies included, with mechanical as the reference category.  
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TABLE 2.7: Linear probability model for use of a provisional (industry subsample analyses)  
 











        
No. of forward citations 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
No. of claims 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of backward citations 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic protection 0.034*** -0.020*** 0.038*** 0.021** 0.037*** 0.061*** 0.052*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
PostAIPA 0.007** 0.034*** 0.024*** -0.018*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
PostAIPA * Domestic protection 0.056*** -0.001 0.031*** -0.008 0.052*** 0.070*** 0.073*** 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 0.042*** 0.021*** 0.000 0.137*** -0.005** 0.000 0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
        
No. obs. 30,841 17,057 38,474 19,956 56,709 42,805 39,441 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




















FIGURE 2.4: Quarter window to/from AIPA effective date  
(coefficients adjusted in reference to pre-AIPA mean in treatment group) 
 















CHAPTER 3: RACING TO PATENT IN FIRST-TO-FILE PATENTING SYSTEMS: 
EVIDENCE FROM PROVISIONAL PATENT APPLICATIONS  





 The patent system incentivizes firms to engage in inventive activity by rewarding them 
with an exclusive right to prevent others from making, using, or selling an invention (Mazzoleni 
& Nelson, 1998). However, the patent right to an invention is awarded on the first-past-the-post 
principle, whereby only the first firm to develop a new invention receives an exclusive property 
right. A firm that is second or third receives virtually no benefit for its efforts, which may result 
in energetic winner-take-all competition among firms to be the first in innovative races 
(Reinganum, 1989; Tirole, 1989). A stark example of such innovative races occurs in first-to-file 
(FTF) patent systems, in which the patent right goes to the first firm to file a patent application. 
FTF patent systems differ from first-to-invent (FTI) systems, which award patents to the first 
firm to invent a technology. In FTF systems, firms presumably have an incentive to race to the 
patent office by filing more patent applications, earlier in the development cycle (Case, 2013). 
However, racing to patent is costly in terms of time as well as resources. In order to file a 
patent earlier, firms will need to accelerate R&D as well as the legal work of drafting an 
application. Due to time compression diseconomies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), the acceleration of 
R&D and legal activities is likely to require more total resources than comparable innovation 
without the need for such acceleration. Additionally, when speeding up the process of invention 
and filing patents, firms may be more prone to making errors, which can undermine the value of 
any patents they are able to obtain. Thus, there are important strategic tradeoffs to consider in 
firms’ innovation racing behavior, which suggest that firms might not always race to file patents 
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in a FTF system. More generally, despite a stream of economics research on patent races (e.g., 
Cockburn & Henderson, 1994; Fudenberg et al., 1983; Isaac & Reynolds, 1988; Reinganum, 
1989), strategic implications of the winner-take-all features of patent systems – such as the first-
to-file rule – are in need of further theoretical development and empirical investigation.  
In this paper, I propose that firms may capitalize on real options in the patenting process 
as a solution to the incentives and challenges they face in a FTF patenting system. In the U.S. 
patent system, such real options are provided by provisional patent applications, whereby firms 
can establish a patent claim on their invention without incurring the full costs of developing the 
invention or completing a detailed patent application. By filing a provisional application, firms 
secure the priority date for an invention and receive one year within which they can pursue 
patent prosecution by filing a regular patent application.  A provisional application secures patent 
priority at substantially lower costs than a regular patent application and provides a firm with the 
right but not the obligation to file a regular application. Therefore, it can be understood as a real 
option on a patent application. More generally, the provisional application is an exemplar of a 
variety of real options available to patentees within the patent system, such as the right to 
withdraw applications (and preserve secrecy), the right to renew patents, the right to enforce 
them, and so on. Prior research suggests that such real options are especially important and 
valuable in patent strategy, which entails a sequence of decisions that are often surrounded by 
significant technological, commercial and legal uncertainties (Pakes, 1986; Somaya, 2012).     
Building on this real options lens, I hypothesize that firms are more likely to “race to 
patent” under a FTF patent system (relative to a FTI system) by filing provisional applications. 
Drawing on prior theory regarding R&D and patent races, I further propose that the magnitude of 
this effect will depend on contingencies such as a firm’s technological dominance, industry 
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concentration, and industry patent effectiveness. Methodologically, I employ a difference-in-
differences (DID) design that leverages the transition of the U.S. patent system from FTI to FTF 
following the America Invents Act (AIA). My findings shed light on an important and 
understudied research question – how do firms strategically respond to the first-past-the-post 
nature of patenting systems? These findings also highlight the importance and use of real options 
in patent strategy, using provisional patent applications as a specific example. Finally, I also 
contribute empirically to our understanding of patent races by employing data from a natural 
quasi-experiment that enables robust identification of causal relationships.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 Existing literature in industrial organization and appropriability strategy has studied why 
firms race to patent, quite independently of each other. I first highlight some of the motives for 
patent racing, combining these lines of research. I then examine how provisional patent 
applications can be viewed as real options on patents and what drives firms to purchase these real 
options in their race to patent.  
 
Motives for patent racing 
The patent right to an invention is awarded on the first-past-the-post principle, whereby 
only the first firm to develop a new invention receives the right to exclusive appropriability (i.e., 
the right to exclude others from making, using, and/or selling the same invention). It is these 
winner-take-all features of patent systems that fundamentally motivate firms to race to patent 
(Cockburn & Henderson, 1994; Lerner, 1997; Tirole, 1989).    
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Furthermore, prior research recognizes two “strategic” motives for patent racing (e.g., 
Blind et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2000) – preemptive and defensive. First, the preemptive motive 
suggests that firms will race to patent inventions in hopes of preventing others from using the 
same and/or adjoining inventions (e.g., Gilbert & Newbery, 1982, 1984; Reinganum, 1983, 
1984). Much of the empirical evidence suggests that the preemptive motive is considered 
important (e.g., Blind et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2000; Pitkethly, 2001). More recently, 
Ceccagnoli (2009) finds that preemptive patenting positively affects firm performance. In the 
technology race framework in industrial organization, both technology leaders and laggards have 
incentives to race to patent for preemption. Given that patent applications are examined for 
issuance in light of prior art, preemptive patenting by one firm adds to prior art and makes it 
difficult for others to obtain any patents (Baker & Mezzeti, 2005; Lichtman et al., 2000). By 
preemptive patenting, the leader can raise the costs of competing for the laggard and drive him 
out of the technology race. By preemptive patenting, the laggard can buy time in the technology 
race and potentially catch up the leader.  
On the other hand, the defensive motive is observed when firms race to patent inventions 
in order to prevent others from vitiating their freedom-to-operate (e.g., Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; 
Kingston, 2001). A fairly large body of research has explored conditions under which the 
defensive motive is more pronounced, most notably “multi-invention” contexts in which building 
a patent portfolio provides the owner bargaining power against numerous external patent holders 
in commercializing a product (e.g., Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Somaya et al., 2011; Ziedonis, 2004). 
The firm can negotiate for better deals with external patent holders by owning a number of 
patents which these other firms may need for commercialization of their own products. Moreover, 
firms may pursue patents for inventions (even ones of little value) with the aim of creating prior 
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art – so-called “defensive publishing” (e.g., Henkel & Jell, 2009; Henkel & Pangerl, 2008; 
Johnson, 2014) – since it will foreclose the possibility of others obtaining patents for the same 
inventions and threatening freedom-to-operate. 
 
Provisional patent applications as real options 
 Under a FTF patenting system, the payoff attached to prompt filing of patents is higher 
because firms that file late may be preempted by an earlier patent filing irrespective of who was 
the first and true inventor. Thus, a FTF system reinforces the first-past-the-post, winner-take-all 
characteristic of the patent system and necessitates racing to obtain the patent right (Case, 2013).  
However, racing to patent is costly and potentially risky. First, firms will need to 
accelerate R&D in order to file a patent sooner. With time compression diseconomies (Dierickx 
& Cool, 1989), firms will not be able to achieve the same productivity level of their R&D 
resources when accelerating innovation. Quite simply, innovating faster will require more total 
resources for the same innovative output. Moreover, when firms seek to accelerate innovation, 
they are more likely to commit errors, such as identifying the wrong technological solution or the 
wrong target market. Similarly, it might also be costly to speed up the legal work of preparing a 
patent application. An average patent application takes one to two weeks to prepare and demands 
the time and attention of the inventor even if a patent attorney drafts it (Case, 2013; Sichelman & 
Graham, 2010). The potential for errors are significant here as well, such as missing important 
prior art, not including an important patent claim, and so on. Indeed, it has been estimated that 
racing to patent can cost firms more than $1billion per year (Boundy & Marquardt, 2010).  
Accordingly, I posit that obtaining real options on patent applications through provisional 
applications will be more valuable under a FTF (than FTI) system. Provisional applications allow 
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firms to get their foot in the door of patent protection more quickly and at lower costs than 
regular patent applications. Requiring only a disclosure and no prior art references or patent 
claims, they allow firms to establish the patent priority date for an invention earlier in the 
development cycle. Applicants may then amend the application, add references and claims, and 
file a regular application within a year. Thus, provisional applications can be used to respond to 
the patent racing challenges posed by a FTF patent system while simultaneously avoiding many 
of the costs and risks associated with early patenting. 
H1. Firms are more likely to use patenting real options (provisional patent applications) in a 
first-to-file (versus a first-to-invent) system.   
 
Market structure 
Prior research suggests that the market structure of an industry affects firms’ incentives to 
race to patent (e.g., Gilbert & Newbery, 1982, 1984; Reinganum, 1983, 1984). However, there 
has been a long-standing debate on whether greater market power leads to higher or lower 
incentives to race to patent. One stream of research suggests that firms in more concentrated 
markets are more incentivized to race to patent because they are able to price the innovation 
higher from a neoclassical economics standpoint. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) suggest that a 
firm with market power can sustain its position by “engaging in sufficiently fast research that it 
does not pay any other entrant to engage in any R&D” (p. 26). Following this logic, the benefits 
of patent racing under a FTF system may be greater when the industry is more concentrated, not 
only because the incumbent firms can anticipate higher ex-post profits but also because they face 
greater negative consequences of not racing to patent. For example, the patenting of a substitute 
invention by a potential entrant may significantly erode profits from existing inventions as well 
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(Gilbert & Newbery, 1982), and will be particularly detrimental for an incumbent with well-
differentiated inventions that enjoy a higher markup. 
Conversely, another stream of research suggests that the increased benefits of patent 
racing may be greater when the industry is less concentrated. Reinganum (1983) contends that a 
dominant incumbent has lower incentives to race to patent for fear that developing a new 
invention may result in the displacement of its existing invention. Thus, a less dominant firm like 
a potential entrant has a greater incentive to race to patent, which is also suggested by prior 
empirical evidence (Lerner, 1997). Following this logic, I expect to observe more aggressive 
patent racing in a less concentrated industry, wherein firms face greater incentives to race to 
patent in order to strengthen their market power in the future. Therefore, under a FTF system, 
firms in less concentrated industries may place a higher value on real options in patent 
application. Reflecting these alternative views on how market structure affects patent racing, I 
advance the following alternative hypotheses:  
H2a. Firms are more likely to use patenting real options (provisional patent applications) in a 
first-to-file (FTF) system when their industry is more concentrated. 
H2b. Firms are more likely to use patenting real options (provisional patent applications) in a 
first-to-file (FTF) system when their industry is less concentrated. 
 
Technological dominance 
Not all firms may be equally motivated to win a patent race and preempt rivals. Prior 
research suggests that a technologically dominant firm may be less concerned about being 
preempted in patent priority (Gandal & Scotchmer, 1993), due to the significant costs of racing 
to patent and because its dominant patent position may already deter other innovators to some 
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degree. Moreover, technologically dominant firms can also profit from sequential innovations 
that are developed by others, but build on (and are also covered by) their own upstream patents 
(Scotchmer, 1991). Therefore, these dominant firms may even choose to collaborate with others 
(e.g., via research joint ventures or licensing agreements) to develop second-generation 
technologies and products that build on their patented inventions, rather than simply seeking to 
preempt such downstream innovation and patenting (Scotchmer, 1991).   
Furthermore, a technologically dominant firm has a better understanding of inventions in 
the technology space than others. A firm understands new inventions based on existing 
inventions, whereby it accumulates knowledge in technology (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). A 
technologically dominant firm can thus have a superior repository of knowledge which is 
applicable to different technology situations. In decision-making in IP, a technologically 
dominant firm may know better the value of patents for its new inventions (i.e., less uncertainty 
in the value of patents) and thus may be less likely to use real options on patents, based on real 
options theory (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994).  
Taken together, I posit that when a firm is technologically dominant (i.e., when others 
build more on the focal firm’s inventions), the benefits of securing patent priority are lower 
relative to the costs of obtaining a real option on such a patent through a provisional application. 
A technologically dominant firm is unable to develop many derivative applications of its 
inventions efficiently by itself, so delegating some R&D to others can be efficient. Moreover, it 
perceives less uncertainty in the value of patents, due to its greater knowledge and experience in 
the technology space. Hence, a technologically more dominant firm will place a lower value on 
real options in patent applications than a technologically less dominant firm. Thus, 
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H3. Firms are more likely to use patenting real options (provisional patent applications) in a 
first-to-file (FTF) system when they have lower technological dominance.  
 
Patent effectiveness 
Patent protection is considered ineffective when patents have high probabilities of being 
invalidated or being invented around (Anton et al., 2006). Because patenting is costly, firms are 
less likely to pursue a patent unless they can justify the significant costs of obtaining and 
enforcing a patent (Sichelman & Graham, 2010). These costs include the significant legal costs 
of conducting an extensive patent search (ranging $5000-$10,000 per application) and drafting 
patent applications (ranging $8,000-$15,000 per application) as well as straight-up filing, 
issuance, and maintenance fees to be paid to the patent office. The post-issuance legal costs of 
monitoring for potential infringement and defending against patent validity challenges are also 
nontrivial, even though the probability of the firm having to bring a lawsuit is low in general. 
Thus, when patents are ineffective, firms have less incentive to pursue them and may instead 
employ other appropriability mechanisms such as secrecy, complementary assets, and lead-time 
advantages (Cohen et al., 2000).  
I submit that when patent protection is less effective, the value of a real option on a patent 
decreases because the value of the underlying asset (the patent) decreases. On the other hand, 
when patents are effective, firms will be more likely to race to patent by buying real options on 
patents. Therefore,   
H4. Firms are more likely to use patenting real options (provisional patent applications) in a 




DATA AND METHODS 
Empirical context 
 I examine what drives firms to race to patent by purchasing real options on patents, in 
response to the increased payoff attached to the prompt filing of patents. Empirically, I leverage 
a major in U.S. patent law, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which was signed into 
law on September 16, 2011. In essence, AIA redefined who has the patent right to an invention. 
Historically, the U.S. had a FTI system, which recognizes the first to invent as entitled to the 
patent right, whereas the rest of the world had a FTF system, which recognizes the first to file a 
patent as entitled to the patent right. After 6 years of the legislative process, the U.S. decided to 
transition from a FTI to FTF system, effective on March 16, 2013. This transition aimed to 
harmonize the U.S. patent system with the systems of the other countries as well as to reduce the 
large volume of patent litigation and interference proceedings, which wasted resources 
determining who is the true inventor and thus has the patent right to the invention under a FTI 
system. The U.S. Congress anticipated that the implementation of a FTF system will “promote 
certainty in the procedures used for securing the exclusive rights of inventors to their 
discoveries”. 
Moreover, the fact that the rest of the world already had a FTF system provides us with a 
control group for my analyses. U.S. inventions pursuing foreign protection were less affected by 
AIA (since these inventions were always subject to a FTF rule both before and after AIA) and 
thus can serve as a control group. By contrast, U.S. inventions pursuing only domestic protection 
were directly affected by AIA and thus can serve as a treatment group.       
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In addition to a FTF system, AIA ushered in several other changes, which I report in 
Appendix Table B.1. For example, AIA expanded the scope of prior user rights
9
 defense to 
include any process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter beyond business methods. 
Thus, we may not know for sure whether firms’ greater use of real options on patents after AIA 
is attributable to a FTF system or other provision changes. However, such concerns are 
insubstantial because it is unclear how these provision changes other than the implementation of 
a FTF system can alter firms’ incentives to race to patent.  
 
Data 
My sample employs data from the USPTO, and consists of 484,907 U.S. “original” non-
continuing utility patent applications which were filed either in a pre-AIA 12-month window 
(September 16, 2010-September 15, 2011) or in a post-AIA 12-month window (March 16, 2013-
March 15, 2014). I exclude continuing utility patent applications because they cannot be filed as 
provisional applications. I further exclude a time period between the enactment and effective 
date of AIA in order to take account of the possibility that firms start to alter behavior during this 
interim period in anticipation of AIA. The sample is based on published applications as of March 
5, 2016.    
I then match my sample with industry concentration data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) and with patent effectiveness (industry average) data from the CMS (Cohen et 
al., 2000). The industry concentration data are matched through the NAICS-USPC concordance 
file from the USPTO, and the patent effectiveness data are first matched through the ISIC-
NAICS concordance file from the United Nations Statistics Division and subsequently through 
                                                          
9
 It applies where the use was at least 1 year prior to the patentee's filing date or the date the invention was disclosed 
to the public for the prior art exception under new Section 102(b). 
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the NAICS-USPC concordance file
10
. Finally, I link my sample to the standardized patent 
assignee name from Thomson Innovation in order to uniquely identify the firm in computing the 
patent citation-based measure of firm technological dominance. As a result, 79% of patents with 
the standardized patent assignee
11
 name in my sample were matched to the organization assignee 




The dependent variable is a firm’s choice to buy a real option on a patent. This choice is 
operationalized as an indicator variable (= 1 if a patent application was initially filed as a 
provisional application; = 0 if as a regular application).      
 
Explanatory variables 
Time period indicator: a time period indicator that indicates a post-AIA patent which was 
initially filed on or after the AIA effective date (March 16, 2013)   
 
Invention pursuing domestic protection: a dummy variable that indicates whether a patent sought 
domestic protection and no foreign protection 
 
I also include the interaction of the variables (i) and (ii), which indicates whether a post-
AIA patent sought only domestic protection. 
                                                          
10
 This procedure was needed to map the patent technology classes (USPC) onto the corresponding industries 
(NAICS/ISIC). 
11
 These assignees can be any type (e.g., individual, non-government organization, or government, etc.), which will 




Industry concentration: a Herfindahl concentration index for manufacturing industries, computed 
as the sum of the squares of the individual sales percentages for the 50 largest firms or the 
universe, whichever is lower, in the industry 
 
Patent effectiveness: the mean percentages of product and process innovations for which patent 
protection is considered effective in the industry (the means computed using the midpoints of the 
five response categories: less than 10%; 10-40%; 41-60%; 61-90%; and greater than 90%) 
 
Technological dominance: the proportion of patent citations controlled by the firm in the citation 
universe of the technological space, computed as a ratio of citations received by the firm to the 
total patent citations received by the technology class (3-digit USPC main class) in the prior five 
years (September 16, 2005-March 16, 2009) 
 
I control for the following variable: 
 
Technology categories: the set of 8 indicator variables which represent each of the 8 international 
patent classification (IPC) sections a patent belongs to: (a) human necessities (13.67%); (b) 
performing operations, transporting (12.26%); (c) chemistry, metallurgy (7.21%); (d) textiles, 
paper (0.44%); (e) fixed constructions (2.25%); (f) mechanical engineering, lighting, heating, 




Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics and correlations for these variables. Panel A 
suggests that there are no significant correlations that are worrisome for my analyses. In Panel B 
I note that the mean of my explanatory variables largely remained the same after AIA for both 
the control and treatment groups, except for the technological dominance variable, which 
significantly decreased by 28.6% after AIA for the treatment group. 
 
Methods 
I employ a difference-in-differences (DID) design to examine firms’ choice to buy a real 
option on a patent (=file a provisional as opposed to a regular application) in their race to obtain 
the patent right. My estimation uses linear probability models with robust standard errors. Linear 
probability models are better-suited to my analyses than non-linear models such as logit and 
probit since we are interested in the marginal effect but not in predicting probabilities. Further, 
when the true conditional expectation function is unknown, linear probability models tend to 
offer the best approximation (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).   
Taken together, I estimate the following linear probability model on a DID design 
(Wooldridge, 2010):  
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝐵 + 𝛿0𝑑2 + 𝛿1𝑑𝐵 ∗ 𝑑2 + 𝑥′𝜃 + 𝑢, 
where 𝑦 is the choice to file a provisional application, 𝑑2 a dummy that indicates a post-AIA 
patent, 𝑑𝐵 a dummy that indicates the treatment group of patents pursuing only domestic 
protection, and 𝑥 the vector of other explanatory variables. The DID estimator 𝛿1, the coefficient 





As a preliminary step, I examine whether a change caused by AIA in the probability of 
buying a real option on patenting was on average different for the control and treatment groups. 
Figure 3.1 shows that there was a much larger increase in the use of provisionals for the 
treatment than control group, after AIA went into effect.  
I further report the mean probability separately for large and small entities
12
 in order to 
look for an indication of size effects. Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics for my dependent 
variable, firms’ choice to buy a real option on patenting (=choice to file a provisional as opposed 
to a regular application)
13
. A few points are noteworthy. First, after AIA went into effect, all four 
groups (control-large; control-small; treatment-large; treatment-small) experienced an increase in 
the mean probability of filing a provisional application. The largest change was in the treatment 
group inventions owned by large entities (+37% from 0.214 to 0.293). The second largest change 
was in the treatment group inventions owned by small entities (+21% from 0.384 to 0.466). We 
see less change in magnitude in the control sample (+3% for large entities; +10% for small 
entities). In addition, provisional applications are filed more often by small than large innovators. 
Then I turn to the analyses which test for my hypotheses. I control for technology 
categories using the dummy which indicates mechanical engineering, lighting, heating and 
weapons as the reference category. In Table 3.3, the significant DID estimate of 0.061 in the full 
sample suggests that the treatment group inventions were 7.0% (0.009+0.061=0.070) more likely 
to buy real options on patents after AIA, whereas the control group inventions were 0.9% more 
likely. The DID estimates for the small and large entities subsample analyses show that the 
                                                          
12
 I use the “small_entity_indicator” variable provided by the USPTO to break down our sample to these two 
subsamples. This variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the applicant qualifies as a small entity, which is typically either 
an individual inventor, a collaboration of individual inventors, a nonprofit organization, or a company with fewer 
than 500 employees; and equal to 0 otherwise. 
13
 The overall 7 percentage point increase in the use of a provisional application post-AIA in the treatment group is 
comparable to what we have seen with the AIPA in Chapter 2 of my dissertation. 
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marginal effect of AIA was greater for inventions owned by large than small innovators (0.069 
versus 0.059). These findings support H1 that firms will be more likely to use patenting real 
options under a FTF than FTI system. 
 
Robustness check 
Before I test H2a, H2b, and H3, I conduct a robustness check for H1. In Figure 3.2, I 
visually illustrate the marginal effect of AIA on firms’ use of provisional applications. While I 
employ the same model for the full sample as in Table 3.3, I use quarter dummies with reference 
to the quarter AIA went into effect, instead of the single dummy indicating post-AIA. In order to 
trace the effect overtime, I temporarily include patent applications filed during the interim period 
between the enactment and effective date, which increases the number of observations to 
900,545 patent applications. The results suggest that the use of provisional applications on 
average increased more than 5 percentage points after AIA. This number represents a more than 
18% increase relative to the pre-AIA average level of use by the treatment group in Table 3.2. 
This finding again confirms H1. 
Next, I test for the competing hypotheses H2a and H2b by examining the coefficients on 
three-way interactions. Since the patent effectiveness variable is measured separately for product 
and process innovations in the industry, I run analyses separately and see if my results are 
different for these product innovation- and process innovation-based patent effectiveness 
measures. 
In Table 3.4 Model (5; product), the three-way interaction with high concentration is 
insignificant in the full sample but significant in the large entity subsample. The economic 
significance of this coefficient in the large entity subsample indicates that a one standard 
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deviation increase from the mean industry concentration leads to a 1.3 percentage point increase 
in the main effect (see Appendix Table B.2). This finding offers partial support for H2a: large 
firms were more likely to use real options on patents under a FTF system when in more 
concentrated industries. An interaction plot Figure 3.3 graphically illustrates this point. By 
contrast, industry concentration did not matter for small firms. Indeed, these findings jointly 
suggest that dominant firms in concentrated industries race to patent in order to sustain their 
market dominance by preempting others, supportive of Gilbert and Newbery (1982). On the 
other hand, although small innovators were frequent users of provisional applications (see Table 
3.2), their use under a FTF system was not impacted by industry concentration. Table 3.4 Model 
(5; process) further suggests that the DID coefficient on the three-way interaction has the same 
sign as Model (5; product) while statistically insignificant. 
I then move onto H3. Table 3.4 Model (5; product) indicates that the coefficient on the 
three-way interaction with technological dominance is negative significant in both the full 
sample and the large entity subsample. As reported in Appendix Table B.2, the economic 
significance of this coefficient suggests that a one standard deviation increase from the mean 
technological dominance leads to a 1.4 percentage point decrease (for the full sample; see also 
Figure 3.4) and a 1.1 percentage point decrease (for the large entity subsample) in the main effect. 
This finding shows that when others had been building on the firm’s inventions to a greater 
extent, the firm was less likely to buy patenting real options after AIA, which corroborates H3. 
The technologically dominant firm seems to let others obtain patents on follow-on inventions 
rather than obtain the patents itself, largely interested in growing the “pie” for value 
appropriation. These results stay the same with the process innovation-based measure of patent 
effectiveness. In fact, the economic significance rises in Table 3.4 Model (5; process): a one 
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standard deviation increase from the mean of a firm’s technological dominance results in a 1.9 
percentage point decrease (for the full sample) and a 1.5 percentage point decrease (for the large 
entity subsample) in the main effect. 
Finally, I test for H4. Table 3.4 Model (5; product) suggests that the coefficient on the 
three-way interaction with patent effectiveness is negative significant in both the full sample and 
the large entity subsample. The economic significance of this result indicates that a one standard 
deviation increase from the mean of the industry effectiveness leads to a 2.6 percentage point 
decrease (for the full sample; see also Figure 3.5) and a 4.1 percentage point decrease (for the 
large entity subsample) in the main effect. Thus, I find no support for H4 and instead find that 
the opposite holds. In high-patent-effectiveness industries, the increased payoff to prompt filing 
as a result of AIA did not impact firms’ incentives since they would race to patent anyway in the 
first place, given the high importance of patent protection in appropriating value from inventions. 
In real options terms, lower uncertainty over the value of patent protection in these industries 
lowers the value of patenting real options. Alternatively, this finding may suggest that firms in 
low-patent-effectiveness industries still race to patent by filing a provisional application, 
primarily driven by defensive preemption motives. Based on the economic significance of the 
coefficients in Appendix Table B.2, I also find that large innovators were even more likely to 
buy patenting real options in low-patent-effectiveness industries than small innovators (|-4.1%| 
versus |-2.6%|) even after controlling for industry concentration and technological dominance. 
Interestingly, in Table 3.4 Model (5; process), while these results stay mostly the same 
with the process innovation-based measure of patent effectiveness, we see that the economic 
significance rises substantially. A one standard deviation increase from the mean industry 
effectiveness leads to a 4.0 percentage point decrease (for the full sample) and a 7.0 percentage 
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point decrease (for the large entity subsample) in the main effect. The greater impact of the 
implementation of a FTF system on process than product patent effective industries may be 
attributed to the empirical observation that patent effectiveness is generally lower for process 
than product innovations (Cohen et al., 2000). Thus, patent real options may have been even 




In Table B.3 of Appendix B, I further investigate how various invention attributes – the 
numbers of forward citations, claims, and backward citations – within the firm influence its 
choice to file a provisional application (relative to a regular application) by using linear 
probability models with assignee fixed effects. I find that these correlates of patent value 
(Harhoff et al., 2003; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004) do not generally impact the firm’s use of 
a provisional application under a FTF system (i.e., after the implementation of AIA), except the 
number of forward citations for a large firm (β=0.0062, p-value<0.05). The likelihood of a large 
firm using a provisional application was greater for an invention which it perceives as potentially 
more valuable. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 The central proposition in this paper is that real options in patent races are more valuable 
under a FTF than a FTI system. Provisional applications establish patent priority at substantially 
lower costs than regular applications and provide firms with the right but not the obligation to 
file regular applications. I leverage U.S. transition from a FTI to a FTF system, implemented by 
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AIA, and find that firms use provisional applications as solutions to the incentives and 
challenges imposed by a FTF system. This finding thus supports my central proposition and 
provides evidence that a real options lens is important for understanding firms’ patenting 
strategies. Given that prior research on real options in innovation focuses on the implications of a 
real options lens for value creation (e.g., Hurry et al., 1992; Mitchel & Hamilton, 1987; McGrath, 
1997; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004; Schwartz, 2004; Schwartz & Moon, 2000), my study 
contributes to this body of literature by highlighting how firms seek to use real options thinking 
to appropriate value from innovations. 
 Furthermore, my contingency findings shed light on the strategic implications of the 
winner-take-all features of patent systems (e.g., Gilbert & Newbery, 1982; Reinganum, 1983; 
Tirole, 1989). I show that the strategies of all firms are not identical, and reflect key differences 
in technological dominance, market concentration, and patent effectiveness. My findings that the 
use of provisionals under a FTF system was more pronounced for firms with less technological 
dominance and greater industry dominance suggest that dominance in upstream and downstream 
spaces can have differential impacts on patent races. Firms were more likely to race to patent 
with real options when they were less dominant in the upstream space and when more dominant 
in the downstream space. These findings add novel insights to the existing literature which has 
not disentangled the multifaceted construct of firm dominance as an antecedent of patent races.         
 Surprisingly, I find that firms used patent race options more heavily under a FTF system 
when they were in industries with less patent effectiveness, in contrast with my expectation. This 
finding may reflect higher uncertainty in patent value in low-patent-effectiveness industries, 
which would increase the option value of provisionals (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994) and/or 
preemptive patenting for defensive purposes, which is arguably more prevalent in such industries 
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(Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). Counterintuitively, firms in low-patent-effectiveness industries by no 
means avoid patenting: they just seem to take a prudent approach to patenting by purchasing real 
options on patents, faced with high patent uncertainty as well as defensive needs for obtaining 
the patent right. In this regard, my findings advances prior research by to patent versus not to 
patent  
Finally, this study also contributes to our empirical understanding of patent races by 
taking advantage of a natural quasi-experiment that enables robust identification of causal 
relationships between FTF rules and firm-level patent strategies. I employ novel data on 
provisionals, which I understand as an exemplar of a variety of real options available to patentees 
within the patent system, such as the right to withdraw applications (and preserve secrecy), the 
right to renew patents, the right to enforce them, and so on. These data enable us to make more 
accurate valuations of real options at the invention level, as called for by recent research on real 
options in the management field (Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017).  
My study could be improved in several ways. Due to data limitations, I am unable to 
observe provisionals which did not lead to the eventual filing of regular applications. Thus, I 
cannot study firms’ exercise of options in patent races. However, the available aggregate data 
(i.e., the number of provisional and/or regular applications filed) will allow us to compare the 
likelihood of provisionals leading to the eventual filing of regular applications before and after 
AIA. If that likelihood increased after AIA, I may view it as indirect evidence that firms were 
more likely to exercise their patent race options after AIA, which substantially increased firms’ 
payoff of prompt patent filing. I believe that these data are worth investigating as a 
supplementary analysis.  
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This study prompts further questions about whether firms’ greater patent racing is the 
manifestation of their inventing more versus filing more. Although I have not examined these 
issues in my study, I believe that the latter is a more plausible story, assuming that only payoffs 
attached to prompt patent filing was altered and nothing else during my sample period. 
Nevertheless, empirically investigating whether that is the case may facilitate better 
understanding of the important phenomenon in economics of innovation. Moreover, even though 
this study broadly examines industry, technology, and appropriability conditions under which 
firms race to patent, we still know little about what exactly motivates these firms to rush to file 
under a FTF system. For example, it can be either preemptive or defensive motives that can drive 
firms to race to patent (e.g., Blind et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2000). In order to understand these 
motives perceived by firms, some qualitative studies of U.S. firms (on their patenting strategies 
after AIA) can be useful and will generally inform research in not only appropriability strategy 
but also law and economics.        
In summary, my study examines what drives firms to use provisional (as opposed to 
regular) applications as real options in patenting, in their race to patent. I leverage the AIA, a 
recent major change in U.S. patent law, and show that the patenting real options are more 
valuable under a FTF than FTI system and that this effect also depends on technological 
dominance, market concentration, and patent effectiveness. My study contributes to the 
appropriability strategies literature – in particular, research on real options in innovation – as 
well as innovation research in industrial organization. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 3.1: Summary statistics and correlation table (n= 484,907 patent applications) 
Panel A 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Provisional 
 
0.177 0.382 0.000 1.000 1.000     
(2) Industry concentration 112.366 55.402 9.000 555.400 -0.036 1.000    
(3) Technological dominance 0.011 0.033 0.000 1.000 -0.059 -0.017 1.000   
(4) Patent effectiveness 
(product) 
34.625 3.827 18.260 40.673 0.003 0.142 -0.009 1.000  
(5) Patent effectiveness 
(process) 




Pre-AIA international  
(n= 186,931 patent applications) 
 
Post-AIA international 
 (n= 185,833 patent applications) 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
Industry concentration 112.498 53.682 9.000 555.400  113.389 55.934 9.000 555.400 
Technological dominance 0.011 0.033 0.000 1.000  0.009 0.030 0.000 1.000 
Patent effectiveness (product) 34.739 3.903 18.260 40.673  34.602 3.947 18.260 40.673 
Patent effectiveness (process) 22.120 2.749 16.400 29.053  21.998 2.641 16.400 29.053 
 
Pre-AIA only domestic  
(n= 54,223 patent applications) 
 
Post-AIA only domestic  
(n= 57,920 patent applications) 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
Industry concentration 109.717 57.735 9.000 555.400  110.929 57.021 9.000 555.400 
Technological dominance 0.021 0.042 0.000 1.000  0.015 0.036 0.000 0.800 
Patent effectiveness (product) 34.481 3.446 18.260 40.673  34.447 3.461 18.260 40.673 




Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics (means) for use of a provisional (n= 484,907 patent applications) 
  
Large entity Small entity 
  
Pre-AIA Post-AIA Pre-AIA Post-AIA 
International protection Mean 0.115 0.119 0.204 0.224 
 Std. err. (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
No. obs. 153,111 151,815 33,820 34,018 
      Domestic protection 
 
0.214 0.293 0.384 0.466 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
  




Table 3.3: Linear probability DID results for use of a provisional 
 Model (1) 
 Full sample Small entity  Large entity 
  subsample subsample 
    
Only domestic protection 0.150*** 0.180*** 0.104*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Post-AIA 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Post-AIA * Only domestic protection 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.069*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Constant 0.104*** 0.158*** 0.090*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Technology category dummies Y Y Y 
    
Observations 484,907 109,120 375,787 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 3.4: Linear probability DID results for use of a provisional  
 Model (5; product) Model (5; process) 
 Full Large entity Full Large entity 
 sample subsample sample subsample 
     
Only domestic protection -0.082** -0.096** -0.474*** -0.545*** 
 (0.036) (0.041) (0.039) (0.047) 
Post-AIA -0.034*** -0.024** -0.023* -0.019 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
High concentration  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High patent effectiveness -0.000 0.001** -0.002*** -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High technological dominance -0.332*** -0.259*** -0.345*** -0.266*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
Post-AIA * Only domestic protection 0.278*** 0.394*** 0.390*** 0.625*** 
 (0.048) (0.056) (0.053) (0.066) 
Post-AIA * High concentration -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Only domestic protection * High concentration -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post-AIA * Only domestic protection * High concentration 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post-AIA * High patent effectiveness 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Only domestic protection * High patent effectiveness 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Post-AIA * Only domestic protection * High patent effectiveness -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.027*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Post-AIA * High technological dominance 0.174*** 0.188*** 0.182*** 0.194*** 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) 
Only domestic protection * High technological dominance -1.559*** -1.295*** -1.427*** -1.190*** 
 (0.069) (0.064) (0.067) (0.062) 
Post-AIA * Only domestic protection * High technological dominance -0.426*** -0.323*** -0.569*** -0.449*** 
 (0.095) (0.089) (0.094) (0.089) 
Constant 0.096*** 0.057*** 0.135*** 0.095*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
Technology category dummies Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 299,141 260,193 299,141 260,193 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Figure 3.2: Linear probability DID coefficients in each quarter (n=900,545 applications)  
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CHAPTER 4: WHEN DO PATENTEES PRESERVE REAL OPTIONS IN PATENT 





Patent term – the length of patent protection conferred to patentees – has been a 
significant subject among policymakers as well as law and economics scholars studying the 
relations between the patent system and innovation (e.g., Abrams, 2009; Devlin & Sukhatme, 
2009; Lemley, 1994). In the past few decades we have seen the U.S. continuously making 
changes to how long it will protect patentees’ exclusive rights to inventions. A quintessential 
policy and research question has mostly been what should be the optimal patent term. Much of 
scholarly work has focused on understanding industry differences which will make some 
industries desire a longer patent term (e.g., Jorde & Teece, 1989; Lemley, 1994; Levin et al., 
1987; Sukhatme & Cramer, 2014).  
However, how various invention attributes may influence firms to pursue a longer patent 
term has received little scrutiny. Examining the invention-level covariates of their preferences is 
important since it sheds light on value appropriation opportunities over the life span of the patent. 
Thus, managers can strategize differently for inventions with different expected life spans. For 
example, for inventions which are likely to create value for a longer time, managers can take a 
risk to develop co-specialized assets to appropriate the value, which they would not for those 
inventions that are likely to live shorter. Furthermore, policymakers can be better informed of 
who may be interested in (or potentially benefit from) obtaining a longer patent term, in 
introducing future reforms to the patent system.  
Prior research recognizes that the importance of patent term varies by industry. 
Depending on the industry, the marginal value of an extra month added to the end of the term for 
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a patent (which will expire in 15 years) is worth from zero to millions of dollars (Crouch, 2015). 
These differences may arise from variation in the technology life cycle (Eurek, 2003; Lemley, 
1994; Sukhatme & Cramer, 2014). For example, pharmaceuticals cannot appropriate value from 
inventions until Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval, which often happens much later 
than patent issuance. While these firms have a much shorter “effective patent term” (i.e., time 
between commercialization and patent expiry), their inventions tend to create value for a longer 
period of time (even after patent expiry) (Eurek, 2003). Thus, pharmaceuticals may desire a 
longer patent term than other industries. On the other hand, firms in computers and 
communications may not be as interested in obtaining a longer patent term because of the fast 
pace of technology development, which makes inventions obsolete in the early years of patent 
term. 
For the purpose of mitigating concerns arising from industry differences, the U.S. 
Congress has amended patent law several times. Among others, the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 
introduced the new provisions of patent term extension to compensate for the commercialization 
delays of drugs and medical inventions resulting from the required FDA approval procedures. 
Given that policymakers should design patent term such that it incentivizes innovation and does 
not permit excess monopoly returns (Devlin & Sukhatme, 2009; Mazzoleni & Nelson, 1998), 
studying firms’ preferences for the length of patent term based on invention as well as industry 
attributes casts useful light on how that can be achieved.  
I examine how various invention attributes impact firms’ preferences for the length of 
patent term by leveraging the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), which was enacted on December 8, 1994 and went into effect on June 8, 1995. 
As a result of this change in U.S. patent law, the U.S. patent term is calculated 20 years from 
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earliest filing as opposed to 17 years from issuance under the old rule. This empirical context 
provides a unique opportunity to study my research question because firms that filed a patent 
during the interim period (from the enactment through effective date) were given whichever 
longer of the two patent terms under the old and the new rule. The availability of this option 
indeed caused a surge of patent applications filed in the days leading up to the transition. The 
patent office reported that more than 50,000 patent applications were received in the 9 days 
before the TRIPS effective date (Montalvo, 1996), which was 10 times greater than a typical rate 
of about 5,000 applications. I understand firms’ filing of a patent immediately before the 
effective date as their choice to buy a real option in patent term extension, and examine how 
various invention attributes drove this choice. Despite my a priori, I take an exploratory approach 
to my empirical analyses.    
 
INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS: TRIPS 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was 
negotiated as part of the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), 
which created the World Trade Organization (WTO). TRIPS incorporated intellectual property 
(IP) law into the international trade system by introducing new significant requirements to the 
existing requirements under the Paris and the Berne Convention (WTO, 2017), and is viewed as 
the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on IP by far. TRIPS stipulated minimum 
standards for national IP law that must be enforced across WTO member countries, but provided 
them with leeway to determine the most appropriate ways to implement these standards in their 
own legal systems and practice.     
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With TRIPS, many countries also entered into bilateral agreements to implement some 
higher standards of IP law. The U.S. and Japan decided on a bilateral agreement in order to 
address concerns regarding each other’s patent system (Lemley, 1994). As a result, the U.S. had 
to transition from the 17-years-from-issuance patent term to the 20-years-from-(earliest) filing 
patent term. Patent term in the U.S. was ordinarily measured 17 years from the date of patent 
issuance, but as TRIPS was signed into law on December 8, 1994 and went into effect on June 8, 
1995, U.S. patent term is measured 20 years from the earliest filing date (i.e., priority date
14
). 
This new 20-year patent term implies that if the interval of time between the earliest filing date 
and the patent issuance date is greater than three years, for that invention the patentee will be 
given a patent term shorter than what it would have been under the old rule. Therefore, firms 
have lower incentives to delay the issuance of patents under the new rule.       
Proponents of TRIPS argued that the new rule would prevent notorious “submarine 
patenting”, whereby patent applicants deliberately delay patent issuance in order to monitor 
rivals developing technologies and claim these technologies as their own in the patent 
application, which unjustly holds up the rivals (Lemley & Moore, 2004; Merges et al., 2003). 
According to the proponents, TRIPS will discourage the use of “continuing” patent applications, 
derivative applications claiming priority to earlier applications and recognized as the key vehicle 
of practicing submarine patenting (Lemley & Moore, 2004). TRIPS provides disincentives to 
keep amending claims through continuing applications since doing so will shorten patent term, 
the time of the exclusive right to appropriate value from an innovation.       
By contrast, opponents of TRIPS, including Representative Dana Rohrabacher and 
Senator Bob Dole – who introduced a bill to restore the old 17-year rule –, contended that the 
                                                          
14
 The priority date is the earliest U.S. patent filing date from which the patent derives its priority over other patent applications.  
For patent applications (specifically claims within the patent) that derive priority through the filing of continuation or divisional 
applications, the priority date is the filing date of the earliest such application. 
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new 20-year rule will adversely affect U.S. patentees by effectively shortening their patent term. 
For example, firms may have lower incentives to engage in R&D since the new rule will 
presumably result in a decrease in royalties from inventions, which can be particularly 
consequential for small innovators and universities (Rohrabacher & Crilly, 1995). According to 
these opponents, it is only foreign and multinational firms that will benefit from the new rule 
because they will not have to pay as large royalties to U.S. patentees as before.    
In its implementation of the new 20-year patent term, the U.S. provided a transition rule, 
where firms that filed a patent during the interim period (from the enactment through effective 
date) were given whichever longer of the two patent terms under the old and the new rule. The 
availability of this option resulted in a surge of patent applications filed in the days leading up to 
the transition. The patent office reported that more than 50,000 patent applications were received 
in the 9 days before the TRIPS effective date (Montalvo, 1996), which was 10 times greater than 
a typical rate of about 5,000 applications. The empirical investigation of such striking revealed 
preference unveils some drivers of firms’ buying real options to extend patent term. Figure 4.1 
graphically illustrates this surge of patent applications leading up to the implementation of the 
new 20-year patent term.  
 
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
I explore invention attributes that may affect a firm’s choice to buy an option to extend 
patent term (i.e., file a patent before the new 20-year patent term comes into force).   
  
Expected prosecution time: 
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Patent prosecution is a back-and-forth process between the applicant and the examiner 
(e.g., Carley et al., 2015; Lemley & Moore, 2004). Once a firm files a patent, an examiner 
reviews it to determine whether it meets the patentability criteria. If the examiner rejects some of 
the claims drafted in the application, the firm responds by further arguing the invention’s 
patentability or by amending these claims to narrow the scope of protection. Then the examiner 
makes a final determination. Although it may be difficult to accurately foresee how long it will 
take to have patents finally granted, given the nature of prosecution processes (consisting of both 
applicant- and examiner-induced delays), firms can form expectations to some extent based on 
their prior experiences in the technology field. While all firms may prefer preserving the right to 
choose between the two patent terms, it will particularly be those firms in anticipation of longer 
delays – and thus the greater likelihood of losing patent term under the new rule – who have 
greater incentives to file before the new 20-year patent term comes into force.   
 
Patent prosecution uncertainty: 
Because of how the prosecution system works, when firms enter into the patenting 
process, they are faced with uncertainty in having a patent granted at a point in time consistent 
with their anticipation. Although firms can form expectations to some extent on how long patent 
prosecution will take based on their prior experiences in the field, patents can be granted much 
earlier or later, or finally disapproved depending on the examiner and invention attributes etc. 
they are dealing with. Unlike the old 17-year patent term, the new 20-year patent term presents 
significant challenges to firms because delays caused by examiners as well as themselves will 
directly reduce patent life they can capitalize on. Because these delays largely cannot be foreseen 
at the outset, firms may choose to buy options to extend patent term. Moreover, if firms perceive 
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the technology to be in an area in which their expectation of prosecution time has historically 
been erroneous to a greater extent, they may be more likely to buy options to extend patent term 
for that technology.       
 
Continuations (continuations, continuation-in-parts, and divisionals): 
Whether a patent is filed as a “continuing” or a non-continuing “original” application 
may impact a firm’s choice to buy options to extend patent term. Inventors are allowed to start 
over the patent prosecution process by filing continuing applications based on earlier filed 
applications which did not lead to issuance (Lemley & Moore, 2004). Because continuing 
applications claim priority to the earlier filed applications, they are more likely to lose patent 
term under TRIPS. Therefore, firms will be more likely to file these applications before TRIPS 
comes into force. In the U.S. continuing applications take one of the following three forms: 
continuation, continuation-in-part, and divisional. The different types of continuing applications 
are filed for different reasons (Hegde et al., 2009), and thus may lead to differential likelihoods 
of firms purchasing options to extend patent term.   
 
Priority lapse: 
Priority lapse, how much time has passed since the earliest filing date (i.e., priority date) 
before a firm files the focal patent application claiming priority to that earlier application, may be 
another important factor that affects the firm’s choice to buy options to extend patent term. I 
expect that firms will be more likely to file before TRIPS comes into force if the application will 
claim priority to much older applications because that application will likely lead to shorter 
patent term. Furthermore, applications which claim priority to much older applications may 
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plausibly be the ones that are more valuable for the firm’s business given the firm’s continuing 
commitment to securing the property right on those inventions. If the firm has an important 
strategic stake in those inventions, it will be more likely to buy options to extend patent term for 
them.  
 
Next, I expect that the more valuable the invention, the more likely that a firm chooses to 
buy options to extend patent term. The construct of invention value is positively correlated with 
the following three variables, which are used extensively to operationalize it in empirical 
research: forward citations, backward citations, and invention breadth.        
 
Forward citations: 
Prior research extensively uses the number of forward citations, defined as the number of 
citations received by the patent from subsequent patents, as a proxy for the value of an invention 
(e.g., Abrams et al., 2013; Hall et al., 2005). The greater number of citations the focal patent 
receives from subsequent patents implies that these patents build on the focal patent to a greater 
extent. Thus, this forward-citation-based proxy for invention value conceptually indicates how 
impactful the focal invention is to subsequent inventions given the cumulative nature of 
innovation processes (e.g., Scotchmer, 1991). 
 
Backward citations (patent references, self-(patent) citations, non-patent references): 
The number of backward citations, the number of citations made by the focal patent to 
prior patents, is used as another proxy for invention value (e.g., Harhoff et al., 2003). I 
understand the greater number of citations made by the patent to prior patents as indicating that 
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the invention builds on knowledge from prior patents to a greater extent. The rationale is 
consistent with prior research which suggests that firms innovate by recombining existing 
knowledge (Carnabuci & Operti, 2013; Katila & Ahuja, 2002), which creates greater economic 
value (Kaplan & Vakili, 2015).  
In patent applications, firms may cite not only prior patents but also prior non-patent 
references, namely scientific publications such as presentations at conferences and symposia, and 
peer-reviewed journals. Since inventions building on patent references (“commercial science”) 
and non-patent references (“open science”) can have different characteristics (e.g., Mukherjee & 
Stern, 2009; Murray & Stern, 2007; Stokes, 1997), I expect that these two types of inventions 
may result in the differential likelihoods of buying options to extend patent term. Further, I also 
take account of self-citations, citations made by the focal patent to prior patents owned by the 
same patentee. The proportion of self-citations reflects the extent to which the patentee builds on 
his own invention, and may represent the patentee’s competitive position in the technology (Hall 
et al., 2005; Trajtenberg et al., 1997). I expect that the greater the proportion of self-citations in 
the total backward patent citations, the more valuable options to extend patent term for the 
protection of the invention which is of strategic importance.         
 
Invention breadth: 
The breadth of an invention reflects how broadly applicable is the invention across 
different technology categories. A more broadly applicable invention (e.g., as a result of basic 
research) may create greater value for society by spurring the greater number of follow-on 
inventions for a long time (e.g., Trajtenberg et al., 1997). Thus, I expect that the more broadly 
applicable the invention is, the more likely that a firm seeks longer patent protection for that 
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invention. Given the cumulative nature of innovations (e.g., Gandal & Scotchmer, 1993; 
Scotchmer, 1991; Trajtenberg et al., 1997), firms at the technology frontier that spur a number of 
follow-on innovations by others may continue to appropriate value from their own innovations 
during the patent term in forms of licensing payments from others etc. 
     
Technology categories: 
Firms’ choice to buy options to extend patent term can be driven by the technology field of their 
inventions. For example, pharmaceuticals typically appropriate greater returns from their 
innovations later towards the end of the patent term given the lengthy processes of clinical trials 
and regulatory approvals (WSJ, 2012), which must be cleared before commercialization, as well 
as the relatively slow pace of the industry. Furthermore, these firms rely heavily on patents as 
their primary appropriability mechanisms (e.g., Anton et al., 2006; Henderson & Cockburn, 
1994). Therefore, pharmaceuticals may plausibly have greater incentives to buy options to 
extend patent term for the protection of their inventions than firms in other industries. By 
contrast, innovations in computers and communications, subject to higher risks of technological 
obsolescence and weak patents (especially in software) may have less incentives to pursue 
options in patent term extension. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
In my investigation of who prefers to buy options to extend patent term, I examine who 
were the ones that caused the striking surge of patent filing immediately before the effective date 
of TRIPS. Specifically, I uncover the covariates of firms’ decision to file patent applications 
during the “surge period” prior to the TRIPS effective date relative to the period immediately 
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following it. I estimate the probability that a patent was filed during the surge period (relative to 




My sample consists of 24,189 U.S. utility patent applications filed one week before 
through two weeks after the TRIPS effective date June 8, 1995, which issued patents by the end 
of 2006. I match my sample to Compustat firms using the USPTO-Compustat correspondence 
file provided by NBER (Bessen, 2009).     
 
Dependent variable 
Choice to file before TRIPS  
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the patent was filed before the TRIPS effective date 
and 0 if on or after.  
 
Explanatory variables 
Expected prosecution time: 
I compute realized prosecution time (= time between the application and issuance dates in 
days) for each patent in a prior sample of patents filed within five years before the TRIPS 
enactment date. I then regress the realized prosecution time on technology category dummies and 
yearly trend. Finally, I use the estimated OLS coefficients to compute expected prosecution time 




Patent prosecution uncertainty: 
I obtain residuals û from the OLS equation estimated earlier based on the prior sample of 
patents. Then I compute the standard deviation of û at the art unit15 level, and link this measure 
to my analysis sample by the art unit. This measure represents variation in prosecution time 
driven by unexpected factors such as examiner-induced delays, and proxies patent prosecution 
uncertainty. 
 
Continuations (continuations, continuation-in-parts, and divisionals): 




I measure priority lapse by the interval of time in days between the priority date and the 
application date of the patent. 
 
Forward citations: 
The number of citations received by the patent from subsequent patents. These forward 
citations data are subject to truncation bias, where a younger patent tends to receive fewer 
citations than an older patent. I address this issue by dividing the number of citations observed as 
of 2014 by the year-technology category average number of citations. 
 
Backward citations (patent references, self-(patent) citations, non-patent references): 
                                                          
15
 Art units are examination groups which the USPTO assigns to examine patent applications covering particular technology 
areas. The assignment to a specific art unit affects patent prosecution time through the backlog of applications in the art unit, the 
nature of objections raised by the examiner (that works in the art unit), and the difficulty of overcoming objections etc. 
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Citations the patent makes to prior patent and non-patent references are measured 
separately. The citations made to patent references are further divided into self-citations 
(whereby the patentee cites a patent owned by himself) and non-self-citations (whereby the 
patentee cites a patent owned by others). I measure self-citations by the proportion of self-
citations in the total citations made by the patent to prior patent references.    
 
Invention breadth: 
I measure invention breadth by the number of international patent classifications (IPCs) 
to which the patent belongs.    
 
Technology categories: 
A set of 6 dummies indicate each of the following technology categories to which the 
patent belongs: chemical (20.10% of my sample); computers and communications (15.78%); 
drugs and medical (26.06%); electrical and electronic (13.97%); mechanical (11.52%); others 
(12.56%). This aggregate classification scheme has been created by Hall et al. (2001) based on 
the more than 500 USPTO technology classes and is available through NBER. 
 
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics and correlations for my variables. Some patterns 
are noteworthy regarding firms’ use of continuing applications. Since continuing applications by 
definition claim priority to earlier applications (either partially or fully), they are positively 
correlated with priority lapse to a moderate degree (ρ=0.567). Continuing applications can also 
take the forms of continuation, continuation-in-part, and divisional, and thus are positively 
correlated with these choices. In addition, because these choices are substitutive to one another, 
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they are negatively correlated with one another. Overall, I do not see significant correlations in 
my variables which may raise concerns for my analyses.       
 
Method 
 In my analyses of what drives firms to buy options to extend patent term by filing a 
patent before (relative to after) the TRIPS effective date, I employ the following logit model, in 
which Y represents the choice, and 𝑋 the set of explanatory variables. I cluster standard errors by 
the patent assignee.   
Prob(Y = 1|𝑋) =
exp (𝑋′𝛽)




 Table 4.2 shows the impact of invention attributes on firms’ choice to file a patent before 
the new 20-year rule came into force. First, the coefficients on technology category dummies 
suggest that chemical, and drug and medical firms were more likely to buy options to extend 
patent term (Model (5) β=0.2231, p-value<0.05; β=0.9418, p-value<0.01).  The marginal effects 
of these technology categories indicate that the predicted probabilities increase by 1.34 
percentage points for chemical firms and 5.66 percentage points for drugs and medical firms. By 
contrast, the coefficients on computers and communications, and electrical and electronic 
innovations were statistically insignificant. These results are consistent with my expectation that 
firms will be more likely to value patent term extension when they are in industries in which 
returns from innovations cannot be appropriated until later towards the end of the patent term 
and slow-moving industries to which stronger patent protection is conferred.  
94 
 
 Second, firms were more likely to buy options to extend patent term for continuing 
relative to original applications (Model (5) β=0.9471, p-value<0.01). The marginal effect 
indicates that the predicted probabilities increase by 5.69 percentage points for continuing 
applications. Because the new 20-year patent term is measured from the earliest filing date of a 
patent, firms plausibly chose to file continuing applications before rather than after the new rule 
came into force as these applications by definition have earlier filing dates than original 
applications and thus are subject to a greater loss of patent term. We can understand these results 
in conjunction with a motivation for this patent term transition, which was to “end the abuse of 
continuations
16
” (Lemley & Moore, 2004). Furthermore, I find that firms’ choice to buy options 
to extend patent term was driven differentially by the different types of continuing applications. 
My results suggest that divisionals and continuations were more likely to be filed before the 
legislative transition (Model (5) β=1.7235, p-value<0.01; β=0.5505, p-value<0.01) whereas 
continuation-in-parts were not. We can make sense of these findings based on whether firms are 
allowed to add new subject matter (thus new claims) when filing the different types of 
continuing applications. Since the entire set of claims in divisionals and continuations must claim 
priority to earlier filed applications, they are the ones that were more likely to be subject to a 
greater loss of patent term under the new 20-year rule and thus be filed before the new 20-year 
rule came into force. By contrast, continuation-in-parts claim new subject matter and establish 
their own filing date for the new claims, and were plausibly not going to be as affected by the 
new 20-year rule as the others.    
Third, my results suggest that citations are indeed interesting drivers of firms’ choice to 
buy options to extend patent term. The numbers of both forward and backward citations indicate 
                                                          
16
 Continuations created many problems such as delaying patent issuance (which increases insecurities for competitors), wearing 
down examiners, and submarine patenting (Lemley & Moore, 2004). 
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that the greater the value of the invention, the more likely that firms will choose to buy options to 
extend patent term (Model (5) β=0.0003, p-value<0.05; β=0.0119, p-value<0.01). A one standard 
deviation increase in the mean number of backward citations leads to a 2.04 percentage point 
increase in the probability of filing before the new 20-year rule came into force, which is higher 
than the economic significance of forward citations 0.38 percentage points.  If the invention is 
potentially more profitable, inferred from these measures (e.g., Harhoff & Reitzig, 2004; 
Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2001; Trajtenberg, 1990), the firm may plausibly choose to 
appropriate returns from the invention longer. Moreover, firms were more likely to buy options 
in patent term extension for inventions which draw on open science (Model (5) β=0.0334, p-
value<0.01). A one standard deviation increase in the mean number of backward non-patent 
citations leads to a 3.98 percentage point increase in the predicted probability. Given that open 
science positively impacts the potential for long-term technological advance (e.g., Adams, 1990; 
Mansfield, 1972), inventions building on open science may create value for a longer time. 
However, to my surprise, I find no evidence that firms will choose to buy options in patent term 
extension for inventions which build on their own prior inventions. The statistically insignificant 
coefficient on self-citations suggests that a firm’s strong competitive position in the invention 
(Hall et al, 2005) does not matter for the choice. Taken altogether, we can infer that a firm will 
value a longer patent term when the invention is valuable to the world and not necessarily when 
the invention is valuable to the firm itself.  
Lastly, I find the broader the invention (i.e., the greater the number of potential 
application areas), the more likely that a firm will choose to buy options to extend patent term 
(Model (5) β=0.0886, p-value<0.05). A one standard deviation increase in the mean invention 
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breadth leads to a 0.34 percentage point increase in the predicted probability. This finding can be 
understood jointly with my earlier findings on invention value measured by citations. 
Next, I turn to Table 4.3, which reports the impact of patent prosecution attributes on 
firms’ choice to buy options to extend patent term. In this analysis, I do not separately include 
technology category dummies because they are captured by expected prosecution time by design. 
This model assumes that technology categories ultimately impact firms’ choice to buy options in 
patent term extension through their impact on firms’ expectation of prosecution time. Consistent 
with my expectation, I find that a greater expected prosecution time led to the greater likelihood 
of firms filing before the new 20-year rule came into force (Model (12) β=0.0013, p-value<0.01). 
A one standard deviation increase in the mean expected prosecution time leads to a 0.71 
percentage point increase in the predicted probability. As firms anticipate that the patent will 
take longer to issue, they may take out options in patent term extension, which enable them to 
compensate for a potential loss of patent term under the new rule.         
 Furthermore, not only was expected prosecution time an important driver for firms to buy 
options in patent term extension but also patent prosecution uncertainty was. Firms seeking to 
patent an invention at an art unit which had historically had greater variation in prosecution time 
were more likely to buy options to extend patent term (Model (12) β=0.0005, p-value<0.01). A 
one standard deviation increase in the mean patent prosecution uncertainty leads to a 0.67 
percentage point increase in the probability of filing before the new 20-year rule came into force. 
This finding is consistent with real options theory that greater uncertainty increases the option 
value. In my context, the option value increases when firms’ ex ante evaluation of the 
prosecution process is likely to be more divergent from the actual process. Taken together, my 
findings imply that firms in anticipation of a long prosecution time and in the face of high 
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prosecution uncertainty were going to be the ones that would find options in patent term 
extension especially valuable.  
 While the impact of the other variables on firms’ choice to buy options in patent term 
extension largely stays the same as we have seen earlier with technology category dummies 
included, I find that invention value measured by the number of forward citations does not matter 
in my models in which the patent prosecution variables are included. I currently do not have a 
clear explanation for this finding given the low correlations between the number of forward 
citations and the two patent prosecution variables (see Table 4.1 ρ=0.098; ρ=-0.072).  
 
Additional analyses 
In Table C.1 of Appendix C, I examine firms’ choice to buy options in patent term 
extension by using models that do not include the expected prosecution time variable. These 
models allow me to examine the effects of patent prosecution uncertainty and industry 
simultaneously. Since the expected prosecution time variable has been created based on 
technology category dummies and yearly trend, it causes a multicollinearity problem when the 
technology category dummies are jointly included in models. In these models, I also take a 
natural log of the priority lapse variable to adjust for its skewness. I find that the results largely 
stay the same as what we have seen earlier in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. The effect of priority lapse 
(logged) becomes insignificant in all models, with the continuing application and its type 
dummies are controlled for.   
Given the high explanatory power of the continuing application in all models, I next 
investigate firms’ choice to file before the new 20-year rule separately for original and 
continuing applications. In Table C.2, I find that patent prosecution uncertainty matters for both 
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original and continuing applications. However, when the various citations variables are included, 
patent prosecution uncertainty matters less for original applications, which suggests that these 
patent value correlates are strongly related to prosecution uncertainty for original applications. 
Interestingly, patent prosecution uncertainty continues to be highly significant for continuing 
applications in firms’ choice to buy options in patent term extension, with the patent value 
correlates included.         
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In highlighting the impact of various invention attributes on firms’ choice to pursue a 
longer patent term, my paper contributes to the literature in IP and appropriability strategies. My 
findings suggest that options to extend patent term were valuable for industries in which 
technology pace is slow and patent protection is strong, such as chemical and drugs and medical 
industries. This finding implies that the value distribution of patent term indeed differs by 
industries, in support for the idea that different industries may need different patent term (e.g., 
Lemley, 1994; Levin et al., 1987; Scherer, 1980). In addition, options in patent term extension 
were more valuable for inventions that were potentially more profitable. This finding provides 
counterevidence to the proposition that value appropriation for significant inventions takes place 
relatively early in their patent term (e.g., Nordhaus, 1969; Scherer, 1980). Firms’ revealed 
preference suggests that value appropriation for significant inventions happens long term and 
extending patent term for these inventions adds value to business. Furthermore, because the new 
20-year patent term is measured from the earliest filing date, continuing patent applications 
(especially, those which add no new subject matter and thus in their entirety claim priority to 
earlier applications) were more likely to benefit from such options.  
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This paper also has theoretical implications for research on real options in innovation. My 
findings shed light on when firms take a real options approach to appropriating value from their 
inventions as long as possible. Consistent with real options theory, which recognizes uncertainty 
as an important driver of the option value (e.g., Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Li et al., 2007; 
Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017), I found that uncertainty in patent prosecution increased the 
likelihood of firms purchasing options in patent term extension. This finding provides new 
insights into firms’ use of real options for value appropriation purposes beyond prior research 
which focuses on real options in value creation (e.g., Hurry et al., 1992; Mitchel & Hamilton, 
1988; McGrath, 1997; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004).  
My findings have further implications for law scholars and policymakers. Despite a large 
body of research examining industry attributes which may justify the implementation of 
industry-specific patent term (e.g., Lemley, 1994; Levin et al., 1987; Scherer, 1980), other 
factors which drive firms to delay the end of their exclusive rights to inventions have received 
scant attention. To my knowledge, this study is the first to provide extensive empirical 
explorations of these factors. While patent policy designs patent term such that it incentivizes 
innovation and at the same time prevents excessive monopoly (Devlin & Sukhatme, 2009; 
Mazzoleni & Nelson, 1998), my findings provide policymakers with useful insights into who 
may be interested in obtaining (and arguably deserve) a longer patent term than others. In fact, 
the U.S. has been ushering in a series of major and/or minor revisions to calculating the length of 
patent protection. The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 implemented patent term extension (PTE) 
and extended patent term to compensate for commercialization delays due to regulatory approval. 
The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 implemented patent term adjustment (PTA) and 
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extended patent term to compensate for PTO-induced delays, in order to mitigate concerns that 
arise under the new 20-year rule.          
Furthermore, this study helps managers to strategize their innovation strategies by 
approximating what will be the life span of their patents. For example, for inventions that are 
likely to live longer, managers may renew the patent right on them by paying multi-staged fees 
(at 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years from issuance) and plausibly envisage long-term value appropriation 
strategies (e.g., investment in co-specialized complementary assets). Firms can differentiate 
value appropriation strategies for these inventions against others. Moreover, my finding that 
firms sought to extend patent term for inventions building on open science suggests that firms 
perceive securing stronger patent protection as even more important for knowledge with roots in 
open science. This finding provides empirical evidence of firms’ efforts to create private 
knowledge from public knowledge (e.g., Cockburn & Henderson, 1998; Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Powell et al., 1996). Given that inventions building on open 
science are likely to create value for a longer period of time, managers can deploy multi-layered 
strategies to develop inventions drawing on open science and secure/maintain strong property 
rights on them in order to enhance value appropriation from innovation.     
My study could be improved in several ways. Although I examine firms’ purchase of 
options to extend patent term, I do not examine their exercise of these options. In my empirical 
context, the “nominal” exercise happens when a patent has issued. If the patent issued within 
three years of the earliest filing date, the patentee would receive patent term extension as the new 
20-year rule permits. If the patent issued after three years of the earliest filing date, the patentee 
would receive patent term extension as the old 17-year rule permits. However, the “actual” 
exercise will happen when the patentee pays a renewal fee at 11.5 years from issuance in order to 
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keep the patent in force for the full patent term. Future research can explore how firms’ filing of 
patents immediately before the transition (i.e., the purchase of options) is correlated with their 
decision to renew these patents (i.e., the exercise of options), which will provide a richer 
description of how firms’ real options reasoning in patenting strategies plays out over time. 
Another avenue for future research is to study how firms’ purchase of options in patent term 
extension covaries with the patent’s other post-grant attributes such as litigation, licensing, and 
ownership transfers. Investigating these various strategies with respect to a patent will be 
interesting since it will capture how a firm’s actions evolve with respect to the patent (Somaya, 
2012).          
In summary, this study examines firms’ revealed preference to file a patent immediately 
before (relative to after) the U.S. patent term transition ushered in by TRIPS. I view this choice 
as firms’ purchase of options to extend patent term and find that the choice is impacted by 
various invention attributes. My study contributes to the literature in IP and appropriability 
strategies and in particular, real options in innovation. 
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TABLES AND FIGURE 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics and correlations for variables 
 Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) Before TRIPS 
(dummy) 












0.613 0.487 0.000 1.000 0.367 0.187 0.171 1.000          
(5) Continuation 
(dummy) 




0.156 0.363 0.000 1.000 0.094 0.076 0.159 0.338 -0.202 1.000        
(7) Divisional 
(dummy) 
0.277 0.447 0.000 1.000 0.225 0.043 0.031 0.473 -0.290 -0.266 1.000       
(8) Priority lapse 885.826 1019.064 0.000 14924.000 0.233 0.184 0.212 0.567 0.280 0.113 0.285 1.000      
(9) No. forward 
citations 
113.678 194.741 0.000 4908.000 0.015 0.098 -0.072 -0.030 -0.007 0.040 -0.050 -0.081 1.000     
(10) No. backward 
citations 
18.818 32.360 0.000 800.000 0.090 -0.005 0.076 0.133 0.006 0.118 0.047 0.126 0.073 1.000    
(11) Proportion. 
self-citations 
0.118 0.221 0.000 1.000 0.040 0.019 -0.003 0.069 0.017 -0.007 0.071 0.091 -0.037 -0.071 1.000   
(12) No. backward 
non-patent 
citations 
10.304 29.296 0.000 787.000 0.124 0.220 0.270 0.189 0.042 0.154 0.042 0.244 -0.008 0.333 -0.036 1.000  
(13) Invention 
breadth 




Table 4.2: Logit models for firms’ choice to file before the new 20-year rule (with technology category dummies) 
 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Marginal  
effects 
       
Chemical (dummy) 0.3575*** 0.3436*** 0.3420*** 0.2376** 0.2231** 0.0134** 
 (0.0936) (0.0950) (0.0953) (0.0967) (0.0969) (0.0059) 
Computers & Communications (dummy) 0.1214 0.1456 0.1492 0.0941 0.0998 0.0060 
 (0.1132) (0.1143) (0.1150) (0.1141) (0.1144) (0.0068) 
Drugs & Medical (dummy) 1.2543*** 1.2849*** 1.2722*** 0.9482*** 0.9418*** 0.0566*** 
 (0.1138) (0.1144) (0.1149) (0.1221) (0.1220) (0.0084) 
Electrical & Electronic (dummy) 0.0827 0.0833 0.0859 0.0776 0.0799 0.0048 
 (0.0996) (0.1007) (0.1012) (0.1006) (0.1010) (0.0060) 
Others (dummy) -0.0074 0.0104 0.0104 -0.0112 -0.0178 -0.0011 
 (0.0963) (0.0963) (0.0960) (0.0947) (0.0950) (0.0057) 
Continuing application (dummy) 2.1329*** 0.9968*** 0.9476*** 0.9514*** 0.9471*** 0.0569*** 
 (0.0805) (0.1850) (0.1816) (0.1880) (0.1883) (0.0118) 
Continuation (dummy)  0.7627*** 0.6558*** 0.5413** 0.5505*** 0.0331** 
  (0.2130) (0.2024) (0.2123) (0.2123) (0.0128) 
Continuation-in-part (dummy)  0.7621*** 0.6955*** 0.3981* 0.3994* 0.0240* 
  (0.2099) (0.1983) (0.2070) (0.2070) (0.0126) 
Divisional (dummy)  1.9097*** 1.8244*** 1.7220*** 1.7235*** 0.1035*** 
  (0.2056) (0.1980) (0.2110) (0.2113) (0.0130) 
Priority lapse   0.0001** 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0000* 
   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
No. forward patent citations    0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0000** 
    (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
No. backward patent citations    0.0119*** 0.0119*** 0.0007*** 
    (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0001) 
Proportion. self-citations    0.1295 0.1247 0.0075 
    (0.1410) (0.1411) (0.0084) 
No. backward non-patent citations    0.0342*** 0.0334*** 0.0020*** 
    (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0003) 
Invention breadth     0.0886** 0.0053** 
     (0.0437) (0.0027) 
Constant 0.5918*** 0.5695*** 0.5462*** 0.3285*** 0.2172**  
 (0.0763) (0.0767) (0.0767) (0.0836) (0.0976)  
No. obs. 21,535 21,535 21,500 20,408 20,408 20,408 




Table 4.3: Logit models for firms’ choice to file before the new 20-year rule (with patent prosecution variables) 
        Marginal 
Variables Model (6) Model(7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) Model (12) effects 
         
Continuing application (dummy) 2.2408*** 2.2030*** 1.1491*** 1.0997*** 1.0997*** 1.0839*** 1.0728*** 0.0644*** 
 (0.0763) (0.0776) (0.1890) (0.1834) (0.1834) (0.1918) (0.1921) (0.0122) 
Expected prosecution time 0.0025*** 0.0019*** 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0000) 
Patent prosecution uncertainty  0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0000*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Continuation (dummy)   0.6354*** 0.5142** 0.5142** 0.4059* 0.4217** 0.0253** 
   (0.2122) (0.2021) (0.2021) (0.2138) (0.2138) (0.0128) 
Continuation-in-part (dummy)   0.6990*** 0.6251*** 0.6251*** 0.3276 0.3335 0.0200 
   (0.2126) (0.2002) (0.2002) (0.2099) (0.2097) (0.0127) 
Divisional (dummy)   1.8314*** 1.7349*** 1.7349*** 1.6322*** 1.6367*** 0.0982*** 
   (0.2036) (0.1959) (0.1959) (0.2119) (0.2122) (0.0131) 
Priority lapse    0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0001* 0.0000* 
    (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
No. forward patent citations      0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 
      (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) 
No. backward patent citations      0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0007*** 
      (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0001) 
Proportion. self-citations      0.1478 0.1399 0.0084 
      (0.1415) (0.1414) (0.0085) 
No. backward non-patent citations      0.0422*** 0.0411*** 0.0025*** 
      (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0003) 
Invention breadth       0.1042** 0.0063** 
       (0.0442) (0.0027) 
Constant -1.0466*** -0.9972*** -1.0884*** -1.0897*** -1.0897*** -0.6894** -0.8434***  
 (0.2702) (0.2650) (0.2637) (0.2626) (0.2626) (0.2718) (0.2774)  
No. obs. 21,535 21,492 21,492 21,457 21,457 20,366 20,366 20,366 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 




Figure 4.1: Number of patent applications filed each week during 12/01/1994-12/08/1995 
 
N.B. The TRIPS effective date June 8, 1995 is in the 23
rd
























Number of Applications Filed Each Week (12/01/1994 - 12/08/1995)
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
 In my dissertation, I highlight what drives firms to purchase real options to preserve 
flexibility in their patenting strategies. Examining firms’ use of real options reasoning is 
important because firms need to deal with significant ex ante uncertainties in making costly 
patenting decisions in the innovation landscape. Although real options theory has substantially 
informed firms’ decision-making in value creation through innovation (e.g., Hurry et al., 1992; 
Mitchel & Hamilton, 1988; McGrath, 1997; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004), how firms can use real 
options to appropriate value from innovation remains relatively understudied. This gap in the 
literature is surprising given that value appropriation is an important goal of firms’ innovation 
strategy (e.g., Lepak et al., 2007; Nordhaus, 1969; Scherer, 1965; Teece, 1986). My dissertation 
contributes to the existing literature by examining how real options provide firms with an ability 
to deal with critical strategic commitment problems under uncertainties in making the value 
appropriation decisions of how to protect their innovations against rivals.       
 In my first empirical study (chapter two), I examine what drives firms to purchase real 
options and delay the time of deciding on the mutually exclusive appropriability mechanisms of 
patenting and secrecy. By doing so, firms can potentially make a better choice of the 
appropriability mechanism for the protection of their inventions, benefiting from the resolution 
of uncertainties. In my second empirical study (chapter three), I examine what drives firms to 
purchase real options and mitigate the patent racing challenges of time compression 
diseconomies (e.g., Dierickx & Cool, 1989). In my third empirical study (chapter four), I 
investigate how firms can purchase real options and choose between a shorter and a longer patent 
term. By doing so, firms can appropriate value from inventions, which vary in their 
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characteristics, however long they want as they go forward in time within the bounds provided 
by the patent system. Thus, my dissertation takes the problem-solving perspective (e.g., 
Nickerson & Zenger, 2004) and proposes that the purchase of real options in patenting strategies 
takes place as a solution to deal with distinct appropriability problems. Furthermore, my 
dissertation assesses the value of real options at the granular, invention level and thus answers 
calls by recent work in strategic management (Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017). Methodologically, I 
leverage three different changes in U.S. patent law and robustly deal with potential endogeneity 
concerns for the antecedents of firms’ purchase of real options. I believe that my dissertation 
opens the door to further research on real options in appropriability strategies. 
In chapter two, I examine the firms’ use of “secrecy options”, which I define as choices 
whereby firms put a stake in the ground for patent protection while preserving the right to 
withdraw from the patenting process without affecting their ability to retain secrecy of 
technologies. I propose that the higher the risk of technology disclosure to rivals, the greater the 
value of secrecy options in the initial acquisition of the patent right. Empirically, I leverage the 
enactment of the American Inventors Protection Act and firms’ use of provisional patent 
applications, and show that patent applicants exposed to faster disclosure of technologies were 
more likely to purchase secrecy options. Strikingly, the filing of a provisional increased by 45.8% 
after AIPA went into effect. Moreover, I find that the value of secrecy options in response to 
faster disclosure was greater for smaller firms, consistent with prior research on knowledge 
misappropriation (e.g., Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Katila et al., 2008) and IP strategies (e.g., 
Arundel, 2001; Sichelman & Graham, 2010). I also find that the value of secrecy options in 
response to faster disclosure was greater for more novel technologies, consistent with real 
options theory (e.g., Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Smit & Trigeorgis, 2004).  
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In chapter three, I examine firms’ use of “patenting real options”. I propose that patenting 
real options are more valuable under a first-to-file (FTF) than a first-to-invent (FTI) system. 
Empirically, I leverage U.S. transition from a FTI to a FTF system, implemented by the America 
Invents Act, and show that firms were 25% more likely to file provisional applications (relative 
to regular applications) as solutions to the incentives and challenges imposed by a FTF system. 
Furthermore, my contingency findings shed light on the strategic implications of the winner-
take-all features of patent systems (e.g., Gilbert & Newbery, 1982; Reinganum, 1983; Tirole, 
1989). I find that the strategies of all firms are not identical, and the use of provisional 
applications in response to the implementation of a FTF system depends on technological 
dominance, market concentration, and patent effectiveness.  
In chapter four, I examine firms’ revealed preference to preserve a longer patent term, 
which varies in many invention attributes. Empirically, I leverage U.S. transition from the 17-
years-from-issuance to the 20-years-from-filing patent term, implemented by the TRIPS 
agreement, which also offered the two discrete choices of either patent term to patentees that 
filed patents during the interim period between the enactment and the effective date. I find that 
firms were more likely to use these options by filing before (relative to after) the TRIPS effective 
date when they expect greater uncertainties in patent prosecution for their inventions, consistent 
with real options theory. Furthermore, I find that real options in patent term extension were more 
valuable for inventions in industries with slow technology pace and inventions that are 
potentially more valuable. 
My dissertation contributes to the appropriability strategies literature by examining how 
firms may use real options reasoning to preserve future decision rights in their patenting 
strategies in the presence of significant uncertainties. In chapter two, I show that firms seek to 
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make the patent-secrecy tradeoff dynamically overtime by purchasing real options while 
patenting. In chapter three, I show that firms seek to gain a foothold in patent protection swiftly 
under a FTF system by purchasing real options and decide at a later time whether to continue 
with securing the patent right when patent uncertainties are resolved. In chapter four, I show that 
firms seek to preserve a longer patent term for their inventions by using real options provided by 
a unique legal setting in order to deal with patent prosecution uncertainties. My dissertation 
studies how firms manage inherent uncertainties – technological, commercial, and/or legal – in 
the patent right and thus answers calls by recent work on patent strategies (Somaya, 2012).     
Furthermore, my dissertation contributes to the real options literature by empirically 
testing for received theory in a new context. Although real options theory greatly informed 
various managerial decisions (e.g., Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Folta & Miller, 2002; Kogut, 1991; 
Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998; Li et al., 2007; McDonald & Siegel, 1986; Smit & Trigeorgis, 2004; 
Teece, 1992; Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017) and value-creating innovation decisions (e.g., Hurry, 
Miller, & Bowman, 1992; Mitchel & Hamilton, 1987; McGrath, 1997; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004), 
a dearth of research persists on how firms can use real options reasoning to appropriate value 
from inventions, which is an important goal of innovation (Lepak et al., 2007; Nordhaus, 1969; 
Scherer, 1965; Teece, 1986). My dissertation sheds light on firms’ use of real options for the 
protection of inventions against others. Empirically, I assess the value of real options at the 
granular, invention level, as called for by recent work as a potentially fruitful approach to real 
option valuation (Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017), and thus make further empirical contributions to 
the real options literature. 
The findings of my dissertation have important implications for management. Especially, 
the examined conditions under which the real options on patents are more valuable provide 
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managers with insights on when to keep options open in their attempts to appropriate value from 
innovation. The specific phenomenon of provisional patent applications, used as a proxy for real 
options on patents, sheds light on potential ways in which managers can keep options open in 
deploying appropriability strategies. While my dissertation shows how firms can deal with 
uncertainties patenting entails in the initial acquisition of the patent right, these uncertainties may 
also pervade the other domains of patent strategy (Somaya, 2012), such as licensing, and 
enforcement and litigation. Examining firms’ use of real options in these domains of patent 
strategy will be a potentially fruitful avenue for future research, complementing the empirical 
studies of my dissertation.  
Finally, my dissertation examines how firms’ patenting strategies interact with changes in 
U.S. patent law and has important implications for policy. The findings of my dissertation 
suggest that firms reacted to legislative changes by changing their patenting behavior promptly. 
In chapter two, we have seen how firms may use provisional patent applications to hedge their 
bets between patents and secrecy for the protection of the same invention, which may potentially 
counteract the patent system’s grand goal of promoting the early dissemination of knowledge 
(Mazzoleni & Nelson, 1998). In chapter three, we have seen that provisional patent applications 
can be used by large firms with greater downstream market power to preempt others from 
obtaining patents on their inventions. This finding may potentially inform policymakers who are 
concerned about anticompetitive firm behavior. In chapter four, the invention attributes which 
affect firms’ preferences to obtain a longer patent term inform policymakers hoping to 
incentivize innovation for who may be interested in obtaining (and arguably deserve) a longer 
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CHAPTER TWO SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 








    
Post-AIPA 0.0118*** 0.0114*** 0.0164** 
 (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0074) 
Domestic protection 0.0075 0.0072 0.0121 
 (0.0068) (0.0086) (0.0098) 
Post-AIPA * Domestic protection 0.0164 0.0526*** -0.0057 
 (0.0100) (0.0143) (0.0128) 
No. forward citations 0.0011 0.0010 0.0013 
 (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Post-AIPA * No. forward citations 0.0020 0.0003 0.0032 
 (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0021) 
Domestic protection * No. forward citations 0.0013 0.0019 0.0007 
 (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0016) 
Post-AIPA * Domestic protection * No. forward citations -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0008 
 (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0031) 
No. claims 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Post-AIPA * No. claims 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Domestic protection * No. claims -0.0007*** -0.0013*** -0.0005 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Post-AIPA * Domestic protection * No. claims -0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0003 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
No. backward citations 0.0009*** 0.0004* 0.0013*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Post-AIPA * No. backward citations -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0006 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
Domestic protection * No. backward citations -0.0007*** -0.0002 -0.0013*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Post-AIPA * Domestic protection * No. backward citations 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0008 
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Constant 0.0643*** 0.0682*** 0.0579*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0064) 
Technology category dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Assignee fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216,500 126,034 90,466 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 






CHAPTER THREE SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Table B.1: AIA effective dates 
Date of Enactment 
September 16, 2011 
1 Year from Enactment 
September 16, 2012 
18 Months from Enactment 
March 16, 2013 
 Prior User Rights - §5 
Patents issued on or after this date 
 
 Post Grant Review - §6 
New Inter Partes Reexam Standard 
Ex Parte Appeals Eliminated 
 
 Fees - §11 
 
 Tax Strategies - §14 
 
 Best Mode - §15 
Suits started on or after this date 
 




 Jurisdiction and Procedural - 
§19 
 
 USPTO Funding - §22 
 General Effective Date - §35 
 
 Oath or Declaration - §4 
 
 Post Grant Review 
Procedures - §6 
New Opposition Proceeding 
New Inter Partes Review 
 
 Third Party Submissions - §8 
 
 Supplemental Examination - 
§12 
 
 Business Method Patent 
Review - §18 
 First Inventor to File - §3 
New §§102 and 103 apply 
 





Table B.2: Economic significance of three-way interaction in Table 3.4 
 
Full sample Large entity subsample 
Model (5; product) 
Industry concentration 0.00811 0.01345 
Patent effectiveness  -0.02631 -0.04128 
Technological dominance -0.01402 -0.01062 
  
Model (5; process)  
Industry concentration 0.00407 0.00492 
Patent effectiveness -0.04001 -0.06955 





Table B.3: Linear probability model for use of a provisional with assignee fixed effects 




    
Post-AIA -0.0000 0.0163 -0.0026 
 (0.0044) (0.0124) (0.0047) 
Domestic protection 0.0485 0.1674*** 0.0470 
 (0.0380) (0.0314) (0.0492) 
Post-AIA * Domestic protection 0.0742* 0.0416 0.0858 
 (0.0438) (0.0318) (0.0573) 
No. forward citations 0.0043*** -0.0011 0.0046*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0029) (0.0013) 
Post-AIA * No. forward citations -0.0039** 0.0014 -0.0042*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0039) (0.0016) 
Domestic protection * No. forward citations -0.0069*** -0.0015 -0.0067*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0075) (0.0024) 
Post-AIA * Domestic protection * No. forward citations 0.0049* -0.0109 0.0062** 
 (0.0026) (0.0090) (0.0027) 
No. claims 0.0002 -0.0016*** 0.0007*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Post-AIA * No. claims 0.0015*** 0.0002 0.0017*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0002) 
Domestic protection * No. claims -0.0004 0.0026*** -0.0013 
 (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0018) 
Post-AIA * Domestic protection * No. claims -0.0018 0.0023* -0.0030 
 (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0023) 
No. backward citations 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Post-AIA * No. backward citations -0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Domestic protection * No. backward citations -0.0001 -0.0006** -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Post-AIA * Domestic protection * No. backward citations -0.0004* -0.0011* -0.0003 
 (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0002) 
Constant 0.1106*** 0.2105*** 0.0895*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0160) (0.0074) 
Technology category dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Assignee fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
No. obs. 265,582 34,033 231,549 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 





CHAPTER FOUR SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Table C.1: Logit models for firms’ choice to file before the new 20-year rule  
Variables Model (13) Model (14) Model (15) Model (16) Model (17) Model (18) Model (19) 
        
Chemical (dummy) 0.3575*** 0.2769*** 0.2629*** 0.1410 0.1410 0.1066 0.0811 
 (0.0936) (0.0939) (0.0952) (0.1249) (0.1249) (0.1246) (0.1257) 
Computers & Communications (dummy) 0.1214 0.0513 0.0761 0.0433 0.0433 0.0373 0.0458 
 (0.1132) (0.1139) (0.1147) (0.1502) (0.1502) (0.1508) (0.1510) 
Drugs & Medical (dummy) 1.2543*** 1.0959*** 1.1260*** 0.8808*** 0.8808*** 0.6892*** 0.6756*** 
 (0.1138) (0.1150) (0.1152) (0.1490) (0.1490) (0.1580) (0.1580) 
Electrical & Electronic (dummy) 0.0827 0.0694 0.0715 0.0299 0.0299 0.0204 0.0191 
 (0.0996) (0.0996) (0.1007) (0.1293) (0.1293) (0.1282) (0.1299) 
Others (dummy) -0.0074 -0.0326 -0.0126 -0.1396 -0.1396 -0.1192 -0.1386 
 (0.0963) (0.0967) (0.0968) (0.1358) (0.1358) (0.1323) (0.1331) 
Continuing application (dummy) 2.1329*** 2.1212*** 0.9773*** 1.1085*** 1.1085*** 1.1239*** 1.1134*** 
 (0.0805) (0.0813) (0.1986) (0.2018) (0.2018) (0.1933) (0.1929) 
Patent prosecution uncertainty  0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Continuation (dummy)   0.7725*** 1.0052*** 1.0052*** 0.8554*** 0.8754*** 
   (0.2253) (0.2223) (0.2223) (0.2202) (0.2197) 
Continuation-in-part (dummy)   0.7361*** 1.0142*** 1.0142*** 0.7267*** 0.7378*** 
   (0.2233) (0.2212) (0.2212) (0.2179) (0.2170) 
Divisional (dummy)   1.9195*** 2.1638*** 2.1638*** 2.0308*** 2.0386*** 
   (0.2175) (0.2167) (0.2167) (0.2200) (0.2202) 
Priority lapse (logged)    0.0321 0.0321 0.0204 0.0143 
    (0.0577) (0.0577) (0.0611) (0.0609) 
No. forward patent citations      0.0004* 0.0004* 
      (0.0002) (0.0002) 
No. backward patent citations      0.0069*** 0.0067*** 
      (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Proportion. self-citations      0.2706* 0.2643* 
      (0.1592) (0.1596) 
No. backward non-patent citations      0.0260*** 0.0245*** 
      (0.0079) (0.0078) 
Invention breadth       0.1586*** 
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       (0.0531) 
Constant 0.5918*** 0.3412*** 0.3161*** -0.1421 -0.1421 -0.1560 -0.3185 
 (0.0763) (0.0875) (0.0880) (0.3851) (0.3851) (0.3977) (0.4033) 
        
No. obs. 21,535 21,492 21,492 16,849 16,849 15,898 15,898 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table C.2: Logit models for firms’ choice to file before the new 20-year rule (split subsample analyses for original and 
continuing applications) 
 
 Original Original Original Continuing Continuing Continuing Continuing 
Variables subsample subsample subsample subsample subsample subsample subsample 
        
Chemical (dummy) 0.2214** 0.1438 0.1471 0.4131** 0.3766** 0.3067* 0.3114* 
 (0.1090) (0.1121) (0.1126) (0.1700) (0.1740) (0.1739) (0.1779) 
Computers & Communications (dummy) 0.0596 0.0105 0.0090 0.0684 0.1146 0.1727 0.2710 
 (0.1271) (0.1284) (0.1282) (0.1960) (0.1970) (0.1971) (0.1942) 
Drugs & Medical (dummy) 1.0348*** 0.7581*** 0.7587*** 1.2063*** 1.0590*** 1.0161*** 1.0381*** 
 (0.1342) (0.1388) (0.1389) (0.2012) (0.2237) (0.2217) (0.2237) 
Electrical & Electronic (dummy) 0.0666 0.0567 0.0561 0.0932 0.1465 0.1798 0.2073 
 (0.1138) (0.1140) (0.1138) (0.1811) (0.1824) (0.1856) (0.1869) 
Others (dummy) -0.0125 -0.0427 -0.0413 -0.1040 -0.0844 -0.1236 0.0032 
 (0.1086) (0.1077) (0.1079) (0.1905) (0.1874) (0.1873) (0.1901) 
Patent prosecution uncertainty 0.0006*** 0.0002* 0.0003* 0.0013*** 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
No. forward patent citations  0.0004** 0.0004**  -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 
  (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
No. backward patent citations  0.0130*** 0.0130***  0.0107*** 0.0101*** 0.0088*** 
  (0.0034) (0.0034)  (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0030) 
Proportion. self-citations  0.0653 0.0674  0.4547** 0.4454* 0.3039 
  (0.1636) (0.1637)  (0.2290) (0.2296) (0.2295) 
No. backward non-patent citations  0.0417*** 0.0419***  0.0197** 0.0169** 0.0187** 
  (0.0098) (0.0099)  (0.0083) (0.0079) (0.0082) 
Invention breadth   -0.0228   0.4326*** 0.3489*** 
   (0.0513)   (0.0858) (0.0896) 
Continuation (dummy)       -0.4969 
       (0.7404) 
Continuation-in-part (dummy)       -0.4627 
       (0.7404) 
Divisional (dummy)       0.7535 
       (0.7442) 
Priority lapse (logged)       0.4330*** 
       (0.0564) 
Constant 0.4227*** 0.2918*** 0.3200*** 2.2073*** 1.9979*** 1.4591*** -1.3668 
 (0.0967) (0.1070) (0.1237) (0.1618) (0.1789) (0.2074) (0.8369) 
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Table C.2 (continued) 
 
No. obs. 7,851 7,533 7,533 13,641 12,865 12,865 12,836 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Reference category: mechanical 
